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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

**THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE CYPRUS PROBLEM
(1959 - 1974)**

by
Liberis Liveriou

June 1999

Thesis Advisor:
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Donald Abenheim
Tjarck G. Roessler

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE June 1999		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE CYPRUS PROBLEM (1959 - 1974)			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Liveriou, Liberis				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) <p>The Cyprus issue appeared during the late-1950s when Britain decided to grant the Cypriot people their independence. The Republic of Cyprus emerged in 1960 provided with an unworkable constitution. As natural as it would be expected to be, intercommunal problems arose just after independence on Cyprus. Greece and Turkey became involved from the beginning as the "motherlands" of the two Cypriot communities. Since after 1963 there was mounting violence on the island republic, the danger of a military confrontation between Greece and Turkey was imminent. War between these two NATO allies in the midst of the Cold War would inevitably cause a defense vacuum in the east Mediterranean.</p> <p>Therefore, the United States, the leading nation of the western power structure, undertook efforts to resolve the dispute and maintain the power balances in the region. The U.S. foreign policy achieved its main goals to prevent Greece and Turkey from fighting with each other, simultaneously maintaining U.S. relations with both countries at an acceptable level, and successfully applied the policy of Soviet détente. However, the U.S. foreign policy of "evenhandedness" generated other side effects that would affect the future U.S. foreign relations in the future.</p> <p>This thesis debunks these side effects by examining the context within which the U.S. foreign policy applied, as well as the detailed U.S. diplomacy that concluded to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.</p>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Cyprus Problem, United States Foreign Policy			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 121	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

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**THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARDS THE CYPRUS PROBLEM (1959 -1974)**

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
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 1999**

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
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ABSTRACT

The Cyprus issue appeared during the late-1950s when Britain decided to grant the Cypriot people their independence. The Republic of Cyprus emerged in 1960 provided with an unworkable constitution. As natural as it would be expected to be, intercommunal problems arose just after independence on Cyprus. Greece and Turkey became involved from the beginning as the "motherlands" of the two Cypriot communities. Since after 1963 there was mounting violence on the island republic, the danger of a military confrontation between Greece and Turkey was imminent. War between these two NATO allies in the midst of the Cold War would inevitably cause a defense vacuum in the east Mediterranean.

Therefore, the United States, the leading nation of the western power structure, undertook efforts to resolve the dispute and maintain the power balances in the region. The U.S. foreign policy achieved its main goals to prevent Greece and Turkey from fighting with each other, simultaneously maintaining U.S. relations with both countries at an acceptable level, and successfully applied the policy of Soviet détente. However, the U.S. foreign policy of "evenhandedness" generated other side effects that would affect the future U.S. foreign relations in the future.

This thesis debunks these side effects by examining the context within which the U.S. foreign policy applied, as well as the detailed U.S. diplomacy that concluded with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	BACKGROUND.....	5
	A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....	5
	B. THE BASICS OF THE DISPUTE.....	12
	1. The London - Zurich Accords.....	16
	2. The Events After Cyprus's Independence to the End of 1963.....	19
III.	THE FIRST CRISIS (DECEMBER 1963 - JUNE 1964).....	23
	A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SITUATION.....	23
	B. EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE - THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY.....	25
	C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.....	42
	D. CONCLUSIONS.....	55
IV.	THE PERIOD BETWEEN JUNE 1964 AND JULY 1974.....	59
	A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SITUATION.....	59
	B. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS FOR RESOLUTION AND THE U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE PROBLEM.....	61
	C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE DISPUTE.....	69
V.	THE SECOND CRISIS - THE TURKISH INVASION OF JULY 1974.....	73
	A. THE EVENTS.....	76
	B. EFFORTS FOR RESOLUTION - THE U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE PROBLEM.....	78

C.	THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE CYPRUS PROBLEM.....	84
D.	CONCLUSIONS.....	90
VI.	CONCLUSIONS - THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE CYPRUS PROBLEM.....	93

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Cyprus issue first appeared during the late-1950s, when Britain decided to grant the Cypriot people their independence. The Republic of Cyprus that emerged in 1960 was provided with a literally unworkable constitution. As natural as it would be expected to be, intercommunal problems arose just after the independence of Cyprus. Greece and Turkey became involved from the beginning as the "motherlands" of the two Cypriot communities. Since after 1963 there was mounting violence on the island republic, the danger of a military confrontation between Greece and Turkey was imminent. War between these two NATO allies in the midst of the Cold War would inevitably cause a defense vacuum in the east Mediterranean.

Therefore, the United States, the leading nation of the western power structure, undertook efforts to resolve the dispute and maintain the power balances in the region. Moreover, the United States was virtually committed to the policy of Soviet détente.

The U.S. foreign policy achieved its main goals to prevent Greece and Turkey from fighting with each other, simultaneously maintaining U.S. relations with both countries at an acceptable level, and successfully applied the policy of Soviet détente. However, the U.S. foreign policy was one of "equal distances between the adversaries. The U.S. "evenhandedness" in the manipulation of the disputed issues generated other side effects that would affect the future U.S. foreign relations in the future.

This thesis debunks these side effects by examining the context within which the U.S. foreign policy applied, as well as the detailed U.S. diplomacy that concluded with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.

The thesis concludes that while the U.S. foreign policy achieved its main goals, it was not capable of resulting in a permanent solution to the Cyprus issue, which in turn was the point of contention between Greece and Turkey. Therefore, the settlement of the dispute would inevitably be only temporary, and both Greece and Turkey had grievances against the United States. Accordingly, the ineffectiveness of the U.S. foreign policy towards generating a viable solution rendered the Cyprus issue to an international problem that would torment all the directly and indirectly involved parties in the years to come.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to dedicate my thesis to the victims of the Turkish aggression in Cyprus.

I would like also to specially thank the visiting professor Colonel Tjarck G. Roessler (German Army) who was critical in helping complete my thesis, and who provided valuable insight into the whole Cyprus issue.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Cyprus issue first appeared in the late-1950s, when Cyprus was granted its independence by the U.K. Since then, the island has undergone three major crises in 1964, 1974, and 1995 respectively. Since 1964, the Cyprus issue has become an increasingly significant part of Greco-Turkish concerns.

Domestic strife between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities has existed at least since late 1963 when the political situation was still mostly under the control of the Cypriot government. Moreover, the ensuing dispute over the control of Cyprus' political affairs did not really affect the country's neighbors, until a critical event occurred in July 1974 that changed the context of the issue thereafter: the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The invasion caused friction between Cyprus and Turkey, and more significantly, between Greece and Turkey.

When the London Accord on the independence of Cyprus was signed by Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and the U.K. in 1960, a "time-bomb" was activated. The provisions of the newly signed Cypriot constitution created political imbalances, which in turn, generated a series of crises.

However, the "great power" that would virtually guarantee the *status quo* of the London-Zurich Accords, namely Great Britain, was reluctant to accept this burden.¹ Consequently, from the beginning of the Cyprus dispute, the United States substituted for the British and actively involved itself diplomatically in the peaceful resolution of the

¹ James A. Bill, *George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Michigan: Book Crafters, Inc., 1997), 183.

problem. Part of the U.S. foreign policy concerning the Cyprus issue, when it appeared, was to safeguard the cohesion of NATO and to maintain stability in the organization's southeastern flank. To this end, the U.S. would have to focus its efforts on averting the possibility of the outbreak of a military confrontation between Greece and Turkey. In the post-World War II period, the United States was the most powerful nation in the Western power structure. Furthermore, it was quite influential in both Greece and Turkey, since both depended on the U.S. for their development. Thus, the U.S. foreign policy played a crucial role in the evolution of the dispute all these years.

The dispute over Cyprus at the beginning—in the early 1960s—was merely an internal conflict between the two co-existing communities on the island (Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots). Nevertheless, the crisis ended developed into a confrontation between not only the two "motherlands" for the ethnic communities, but also between NATO allies of the United States, namely, Greece and Turkey.

However, despite intense diplomatic pressure on both Greece and Turkey, Turkey invaded Cyprus in the summer of 1974 anyway. Therefore, a crucial question arises: why was the United States unable to deter Turkey in such a way as to avoid U.S. entanglement, which would inevitably follow after an invasion of Cyprus? The sequence of political efforts that followed the outbreak of violence in Cyprus in December 1963 aimed at the resolution of the dispute proves that the Turkish invasion was just a matter of time. Thus, another question arises: what were the consequences of the United States' foreign policy in Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus? Moreover, how did these consequences affect the evolution of the dispute over Cyprus that resulted in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974?

As mentioned before, the U.S. played a decisive role in the problem, since it had applied diplomacy throughout the years. The year 1974 was significant for Cyprus, since it was then that the island republic was *de facto* partitioned, a result of the Turkish military invasion of Cyprus.

In order to establish the degree of responsibility the U.S. had concerning the evolution of the problem, an analysis of the United States foreign policy from 1964 until 1974 is essential. Thus, the implications that such policy had in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, as well as the way it affected the evolution of the Cyprus dispute (eventually leading to the Turkish invasion) should become clearer.

Moreover, this study investigates the context within which the aforementioned U.S. foreign policy functioned. For this purpose, it is essential to explore in brief Cypriot history in order to determine the pre-conditions that led to the Cyprus dispute of the mid-1960s. Further, to complete the background of the Cyprus problem, one must clarify the specific conditions that existed when Cyprus became independent, the conditions that led, in turn, to the emergence of the central problem of nationalities and territories.

II. BACKGROUND

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

History is a factor that contributes significantly to the shaping of the contemporary national conscience within a state. The evolutionary process of the formulation of a state as old as Cyprus sheds light on many seemingly obscure sides of the state's character. Moreover, the past would help explain a great number of the state's reactions to the various external stimuli, which to a foreigner would seem either impossible to understand or at least irrational.

Cyprus has been inhabited for more than 7,000 years (its existence having been documented from the eighth century B.C.). One might argue that its unique geographic features determined much of its fate. The island is located at a strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean at the crossroads of Europe, Africa and the Middle East. Its strategic location, its long exposed coastline, and its small size made the island attractive and easy to conquer.² In the course of its long history, Cyprus has been conquered by most of the major powers of the respective eras.

Greek culture was introduced to Cyprus by the Achaean Greeks who settled on the island during the second millennium B.C.³ After the end of the Trojan War, Mycenaean Greeks arrived in droves as permanent settlers on Cyprus, a process that

² Kyriacos C. Markides, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic* (South Braintree, Mass.: The Alpine Press, 1977), 2.

³ Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 16.

started around 1200 B.C. and lasted for more than a century. The newcomers brought with them their language, their advanced technology and introduced a new perspective on visual arts. Since 1220 B.C., Cyprus has remained predominantly Greek in culture, language and population, despite various non-Greek influences resulting from successive conquests.

In the ninth century B.C., the Phoenicians arrived in Cyprus, probably fleeing from their homeland (modern Lebanon) because of harassment by the Assyrians. As Mycenaean Greece was divided in small independent kingdoms, so was Cyprus, by being divided into ten petty kingdoms that were ruled by a king. However, it managed to keep its traditions alive during its long history. Kinship was preserved even under foreign occupations, as the cities of Cyprus remained independent even after their submission to the Assyrians in 709, the Egyptians in 569 and the Persians in 545 B.C. respectively.

Under the Persians, the kings of Cyprus retained their independence, though paying tribute to their overlord. In the Persian Empire, Cyprus formed part of the fifth *satrapy*, and in addition to tribute, it had to supply the Persians with ships and crews. The Greeks of Cyprus shared their fate with the Greeks of Ionia (West Coast of Asia Minor - now Turkey) with whom they forged closer ties. When the Ionian Greeks revolted against Persia (499 B.C.), the Cypriots joined in at the instigation of Onesilos, brother of the king of Salamis, whom he dethroned for not wanting to fight for independence. The Persians reacted quickly sending a considerable force against Onesilos, and the former won despite the help that Ionians provided the Cypriots with. After the Persian victory, the Greeks mounted various expeditions against Cyprus in order to liberate it from the Persian yoke, but all their efforts bore only temporary results.

Following these events, Persian rule became more oppressive and favored the Phoenicians over the Greeks. This situation remained quite unaltered until the Hellenistic era. When Alexander the Great marched southwards, and then towards the heart of the Persian Empire, and finally India, the Cypriot Kings assisted him in many ways, especially with their ships during the siege of Tyre. In appreciation, Alexander set them free. This period, however, was very brief since the Macedonian King died soon afterwards and Cyprus became the focal point of contention among his successors.

Finally, Cyprus was secured in 294 B.C. by Ptolemy, who ruled Egypt where he established a dynasty that lasted for three centuries. Ptolemaic rule was rigid and exploited the island's resources to the utmost, particularly timber and copper.

In 58 B.C. the tribune Claudius Pulcher delivered a law implemented by Cato, which turned Cyprus into a Roman province attached to that of Cilicia. During the civil wars, Cyprus was briefly given to Cleopatra of Egypt by Julius Caesar and later by Mark Antony. It reverted to Roman rule in 30 B.C. and in 22 B.C. became a Senatorial Province. *Pax Romana* (Roman peace) was maintained on the island and was only once disturbed in three centuries of Roman occupation.

No doubt the most important event that occurred in Roman Cyprus was the visit by the Apostles Paul and Barnabas, having with them also St. Mark, who came to the island at the outset of their first missionary journey in 45 A.D. After their arrival at Salamis, they proceeded to Paphos where they converted the Roman Governor Sergius Paulus to Christianity, which opened the way to Christianity for the Cypriots.

As we have seen before, the conquerors of Cyprus during antiquity included the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Phoenicians, the Persians, the Ptolemies, and the Romans,

all of whom left their imprint on the island. In this respect, Cypriot culture has exhibited elasticity, which had also characterized Hellenism historically. It has received and absorbed external cultural influences while preserving the essence of Greek cultural characteristics as these are reflected in the language, the Cypriot dialect, and in traditions and customs. Greek culture has been complemented by that of Byzantium, which itself was a marriage between Christianity and Hellenism. Cyprus had been under Byzantine rule from the fourth to the twelfth centuries.

The rise of Islam in the seventh century and the ensuing Islamic conquests rendered Cyprus a borderland between Byzantine Christianity and Islam. Consequently, Cyprus was subject to repeated raids by the Saracen Muslims between the seventh and the tenth centuries.

As the Byzantine Empire declined, there was an interlude of Lusignian-French and Venetian-crusader rule over Cyprus from the late-twelfth to the sixteenth century.⁴ Frankish and Italian influence on Cypriot culture was significant, but still remained secondary to the lasting influence of Byzantium.

The Ottoman Turks conquered Cyprus in 1571,⁵ and ruled the island for three centuries until 1878, when Britain became the new colonial master of the island. It was during the Ottoman period that the first Ottoman Muslim settlers were transferred to Cyprus and formed the basis of what would become the Turkish-Cypriot community on the island.⁶ As they did throughout their empire in the Eastern Mediterranean and the

⁴ Kyriacos C. Markides, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic* (South Braintree, Mass.: The Alpine Press, 1977), 3.

⁵ Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 16.

⁶ Kyriacos C. Markides, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic* (South Braintree, Mass.: The Alpine Press, 1977), 3.

Balkans, the Ottoman Turks brought along with them their Islamic faith and culture, which is evident in the mosques and other monuments found on Cyprus today. The Orthodox Christian population of the island was ruled under the *millet* system according to which the Orthodox Church became the representative of the Christians before the Sultan and the local Ottoman authorities.⁷ According to this system, each religious ethnic group was treated as a distinct entity, with the church playing a decisive role in administrative matters.⁸ Furthermore, Ottoman presence was evident through the Turkish minority, whose members lived around the island.

For the Greek Cypriot majority, the Autocephalus Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus was a central social institution. The church was the dominant institution that helped them preserve their religious, ethnic, cultural, and political identity.⁹ Therefore, it occupied a special position in Greek Cypriot culture. The archbishop was the religious and political leader of the Greek Cypriot community.¹⁰ Life in Christian villages, revolved around the church and its traditions and rituals. Moreover, the church played an important role in education in urban and rural areas alike.

For the Turkish Cypriot minority, however, Islam was the way of life. Ataturk's secular reforms in Turkey had an influence on a small number of Turkish Cypriots, especially on the educated urban class. However, the majority of Turkish Cypriots were peasants, and Islam remained the major axis around which life in the Muslim villages revolved.

⁷ Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 17.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

While religion played a very important role in shaping both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot cultures respectively, there were areas where the Christian-Muslim dichotomy was not as clear. There were several villages throughout Cyprus where religious syncretism was practiced. There were a few thousand Turkish Cypriots, known as crypto-Christians, who professed the Muslim faith but also engaged in Christian religious practices. Furthermore, over 60 percent of the Turkish Cypriot population lived in mixed villages, where many Turkish Cypriots spoke and communicated with their neighbors in Greek.¹¹ In mixed villages, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots patronized each other's businesses. The two groups cooperated closely in the economic field. This was especially the case in the agricultural sector given the interdependence among Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot farmers. The two groups also cooperated closely in the labor and cooperative movements throughout Cyprus. Overall, notwithstanding occasional crises, there was a considerable degree of Greek and Turkish Cypriot symbiosis. The two communities continued to live together peacefully during British colonial rule and up until the aftermath of the Second World War.¹²

In 1878, under the Cyprus convention that was signed at the Congress of Berlin, Britain took control of Cyprus from Turkey. The sultan ceded Cyprus to Britain in exchange for a promise to help Turkey defend itself against Russian expansionism.

¹¹ "Cyprus: History, People and Culture," (No date), Available [Online]: <<http://www.glavx.org/cyprus/cyhistor.htm>>, published by the Speros Vriionis Center for the Study of Hellenism [8 April 1999].

¹² Jeff Ertugrul, "Turkish Cypriots in South Cyprus," (No date), Available [Online]: <<http://kktc.pubinfo.gov.nc.tr/h130299a.htm>>, published by the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense Public Relations Department" [5 March 1999].

According to a British census conducted in 1881, the population composition of the island was 74 percent Greek Orthodox, and 24.5 percent Muslim Turkish.¹³

In 1914, after Turkey had joined forces with the Central Powers in World War I, Britain declared the 1878 convention invalid and annexed Cyprus. After the end of World War I, in accordance with the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, Turkey officially recognized the annexation of Cyprus by the British. Finally, in 1925, Cyprus was proclaimed a colony of the British crown. Cyprus remained a traditional society throughout British colonial rule (1878-1960).

At the time of independence in 1960, Greek-Cypriots constituted 78 percent of the population and Turkish-Cypriots 18 percent.¹⁴ In other words, four-fifths of the population were Greek Cypriots of the Christian Orthodox faith and one-fifth were Turkish Cypriots of the Muslim faith. After 80 years of British rule, Cyprus contained a large Greek-speaking majority, and Greek Orthodoxy was integrated into Cypriot idiosyncrasies to produce what is known as Cypriot culture.

British influence was obvious on Cyprus especially with respect to its legal and public administration system that affected culture and the way of life. The earlier Ottoman administrative system had earlier had an effect on the island, particularly in land distribution, social stratification, and in the administration of the Church through the *millet* system. Nevertheless, the British legal system and methods of public administration gradually superseded and replaced the Ottoman ones. Moreover, Britain

¹³ "Cyprus: History, People and Culture" (No date), Available [Online]: <<http://www.glavx.org/cyprus/cyhistor.htm>>, published by the Speros Vriionis Center for the Study of Hellenism [8 April 1999].

¹⁴ Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 16.

gradually introduced Cyprus, in the context of colonialism, into the path of capitalist economy. Notwithstanding the colonial and periodically repressive character of British rule, Greek Cypriots felt much more affinity to Britain's western culture, economic system and British ways in general, than to the Ottoman Muslim culture and the Oriental despotism of the Ottoman Turks.

Ultimately in Cypriot history however, one could argue that among the many rulers of Cyprus, only the Greeks and the Ottomans had a significant long-lasting impact on the Cypriots themselves. The Greeks provided Cyprus with its distinct Greek culture and identity, while the Ottomans that colonized the island, during their occupation promoted a separate identity, and accordingly, the basis for polarization between the two co-existing communities.

B. THE BASICS OF THE DISPUTE

Britain granted independence to Cyprus in 1960 under pressure from three coincidental factors. First, the Greek Cypriot anti-colonial struggles of the 1950s took the form of a guerilla war. They were spearheaded by the Church of Cyprus under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios III, and the underground National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), led by its Greek founder General, George Grivas Dighenis. The Greek Cypriot struggle was carried out from 1955 to 1959, and proved to be quite expensive for the British colonial authorities. The main aim of the struggle was *enosis* (union) with Greece, which supported the movement.

Second, broader anti-colonial movements and de-colonization processes were sweeping the world in the 1950s.¹⁵ Thus, global pressure arose for a change in the administrative status of Cyprus to independence. This feeling was particularly strong in the United Nations after the internationalization of the Cyprus issue, a result of the expansion of the Cypriot struggle to Greece and Turkey. The matter of independence was relegated to the United Nations General Assembly from 1954 to 1958, and promoted by Greek appeals asking for the application of the principles of equal rights and self-determination to Cyprus.

It is critical here to mention that Cyprus' independence was supported during the UN debates by the communist bloc and the Third World countries.¹⁶ This fact makes sense out of the posturing of the future Cypriot president, Makarios, during the evolution of the dispute.

The Greek and Greek Cypriot struggle in the UN arena, along with a Turkish and Turkish Cypriot wish for partition of the island were finally resolved for the time being. The UN General Assembly issued its recommendation for a peaceful solution of the Cyprus colonial problem in accordance with the UN Charter. On 26 February 1957, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 1013 (XI). Almost three months later on 5 December 1958, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 1287 (XIII), basically a reiteration of Resolution 1013 (XI), which had already officially opened the way for Cyprus' independence.

¹⁵ Robert H. Jackson, and Alan James, *States in a Changing World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 3.

¹⁶ Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1997), 20.

The third factor was the American pressure exerted on Britain, Greece, and Turkey to seek a solution to the Cyprus problem, which was an “open wound” in NATO. Incidents of ethnic violence had occurred in the island and tension was growing between Greece and Turkey.¹⁷ Accordingly, the United States was concerned with the mounting tension between its two NATO allies, a situation that admittedly threatened the Western alliance’s cohesion. The U.S. concern over the issue was manifested in its unsuccessful initiatives, taken in 1957 and 1958, to resolve the dispute over Cyprus peacefully within the NATO context.¹⁸

Furthermore, Greece, motivated by nationalistic sentiments, advocated *enosis* with Cyprus. To boost the Cypriot unionist sentiments with those of Greece, General Grivas met with Makarios in 1955. There, he stated that the unionists group needed a name and suggested that they be called the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (*Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston*—EOKA). Makarios agreed, and within a few months, EOKA was widely known.

The Turkish Cypriot reaction was the formation of an underground political organization known as *Volkan* (volcano). In 1957, Volkan eventually established the Turkish Resistance Organization (*Türk Mukavemet Teskilâti*—TMT), a guerrilla group that fought for Turkish Cypriot interests.

The result of all these pressing factors was that the effort to settle the colonial problem of Cyprus would focus primarily on diplomacy. However, increased violence on the island by 1958 accelerated the process and begged for a permanent solution to the

¹⁷ The Middle East Journal, 13 (Summer 1959), 235-248.

¹⁸ Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1997), 20.

Cyprus issue. Turkish and Greek Cypriots were using violence against both the British and each other. The Greek and Turkish governments, on the other hand, pressed by nationalistic demonstrations, secretly supported the organizers of violence in Cyprus.

This tension grew while the British were promoting in vain a new constitutional plan, the MacMillan Plan, to which none of the participants directly in the dispute would even listen. During the late-1950s, the Cyprus issue became a major preoccupation of the three directly involved Prime Ministers: Harold MacMillan of Britain, Constantine Karamanlis of Greece, and Adnan Menderes of Turkey. In an effort to settle the dispute, the British Prime Minister visited Cyprus, where he proposed the MacMillan plan. The plan provided the two communities of Cyprus with separate representative assemblies, with a British Governor, that both communities would be represented in the Government, and the appointment of resident advisors to the Governor by both Greece and Turkey.¹⁹

It was clear that the MacMillan plan favored the Turkish Cypriot side for two reasons. First, by appointing a Turkish advisor to the British Governor, the plan would reflect the power imbalance. Turkey was a strong (if not the strongest) power in the eastern Mediterranean region. Therefore, if the Greek government were not able to force Makarios to accept the MacMillan plan, Greece would have to fight with Turkey under unfavorable terms (at least numerically) for the possession of Cyprus. Second, by providing for separate assemblies of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the plan could be considered a step towards partition of the island, a situation which the Turkish side was more than willing to accept.

¹⁹ Brian Lapping, *End of Empire* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 340.

As expected, the Greek government asked for the modification of certain terms of the plan that would equally reflect the political interests in Cyprus. Turkey did not accept any modification to the initial proposal, so the MacMillan plan was finally abandoned. The situation called for a more decisive action plan and higher-level diplomacy, elements that the British Colonial and Foreign Office could not produce. Thus, in the end direct negotiations between Greece and Turkey became necessary. Accordingly, the next step for the resolution of the dispute would be taken in Zurich in 1959.

1. The London-Zurich Accords

From the beginning of the negotiations regarding Cyprus, the Greek and Turkish objectives were clear. The Greek side favored independence (i.e., no links with the motherlands) with guarantees, whereas Turkey (along with the Turkish Cypriots) favored partition. The British, having virtually decided to surrender their sovereignty to Cyprus (under certain guarantees by the Greeks for maintaining a presence on the island), let the two opposing sides (Greece and Turkey) seek an acceptable solution to the Cyprus problem on their own. The British merely played the role of the distant mediator that would have the final say over the outcome of the negotiations between Greece and Turkey. Nevertheless, the only solution that they would ever put on the diplomatic table concerning a potential solution was the MacMillan plan.

The Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, Mr. Evangelos Averoff and Mr. Fatim Zorlu respectively, were initially involved with a process that was taking place in the triangle formed by Britain, the United Nations, and NATO. After the aforementioned

deadlock in the negotiations, the two foreign ministers agreed secretly to find an acceptable solution.²⁰ Secret bilateral meetings between Greece and Turkey started in December 1958, and by February 1959 proved fruitful. The Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers, joined by the two foreign ministers, met in Zurich to draw up a settlement.

Before the meeting however, the Greek government had conferred with Makarios and secured the archbishop's approval for the positions it would take during the meeting in Zurich.²¹ The predominant issue during the meeting was the quarrel over the Turkish demand for a base in Cyprus; the Greeks could by no means accept it.

Greece and Turkey finally agreed to sign a treaty with Cyprus, both guaranteeing Cypriot independence. Another provision was the establishment of Greek and Turkish garrisons (950 and 650 men, respectively²²) on Cyprus, who would join the Cypriot soldiers. The President of the new republic would be elected by the Greek Cypriots, and the Vice-President by the Turkish Cypriots. Both would be granted substantial veto powers over governmental actions, while all subordinate parts of the government would be intertwined and mutually restraining. After his return to Athens, Karamanlis gave Makarios a full and detailed account of the agreed-upon terms in Zurich, which Makarios praised in public.²³

Having concluded an agreement, the Greek and Turkish officials brought the agreement to the British government. The British were naturally delighted and agreed to making the Zurich agreement official. Thus, they proposed a short formal conference to

²⁰ Brian Lapping, *End of Empire* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 342-343.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 343.

²² Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson, and Raimondo Luraghi (Wilmington, De: SR Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985), 193.

²³ Brian Lapping, *End of Empire* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 345.

be held in London at which all the interested parties, including the respective leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, would sign their acceptance. The Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis presented the British proposal to Makarios, and expressed his acceptance of the London settlement only after the Cypriot leader consented.²⁴

The Greek government, however, was caught by surprise to learn that Makarios intended to bring to London 35 Greek Cypriots to express their opinions on the proposed agreement.²⁵ It was clear that the Archbishop wanted to press for modifications on the previously agreed-upon terms, and sign an agreement only after it would be favorable to the Greek Cypriots. If this were to take place, the London conference would almost certainly have taken place in vain. As a result, Averoff met with Makarios' Cypriot group and ensured that they would not disagree.

Finally, with Makarios's objections overcome, the Zurich agreement became official in London on 19 February 1959, signed by Britain, Greece, Turkey, and the two Cypriot communities.²⁶ In December 1959, elections were held in Cyprus, which made Makarios President of Cyprus and Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, leader of the Turkish Cypriots, Vice-President. The final step towards Cyprus' independence was taken in Nicosia on 16 August 1960. The Treaties of establishment, of Guarantee, and of Alliance were signed and the Republic of Cyprus was formally established.²⁷

²⁴ Brian Lapping, *End of Empire* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 344.

²⁵ Ibid, 345.

²⁶ Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1997), 20-21.

²⁷ Brian Lapping, *End of Empire* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 349.

2. The Events After Cyprus' Independence to the End of 1963

When the London Accords were signed, a "time bomb" was activated in Cyprus. The constitutional provisions of the Treaty of Establishment of the new republic had created imbalances that would likely result in an eruption of violence on the island. Problems within the community, and militant factions already existed on the island. The EOKA had officially disbanded and surrendered its weapons in 1959, and Grivas had returned to Greece. In fact, however, many former EOKA members had retained their weapons, and some joined groups of armed irregulars. The Turkish Cypriot community responded to the growth of these groups by reviving the TMT in early 1962. These forces received arms and assistance from the Greek and Turkish contingents assigned to the island.²⁸

During the first post-independence years, Archbishop Makarios treated his vice-president in a way that reflected the political reality (overwhelming Greek Cypriot dominance in terms of population) rather than according to the constitution of Cyprus.²⁹ Makarios's unconstitutional treatment of the Turkish Cypriot minority made the latter react in a way that was equally disruptive. In December 1961, the Turkish Cypriots applied their constitutional right to refuse to vote for the budget,³⁰ thus depriving the Cyprus Government of its ability to collect its income.

²⁸ John Higgins, "Cyprus: A Country Study" (No date), Available [Online]: <<http://www.usfca.edu/~higginsj/tcvoices/ushpart1.html>>, published by the University of San Francisco [18 February 1999].

²⁹ Brian Lapping, *End of Empire* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 349.

³⁰ Ibid.

The following two years, up to the late 1963, were a constant repetition of the aforementioned picture in Cypriot politics. The political life of Cyprus was polarized along ethnic lines, which in turn led to legal and political deadlocks. Consequently, a revision of the constitutional provisions of the London-Zurich Accords was put under consideration. Hence, in November 1963, President Makarios proposed thirteen points to Vice-President Kutchuk for "revision of at least some of those provisions which impede the smooth functioning and development of the State."³¹ Makarios' proposed constitutional revision included provisions that mainly addressed constitutional deadlocks.

The central principles of Makarios's thirteen-point proposition were the following:³²

- a. Cancellation of the veto right of the president and the vice-president.
- b. Abolition of the separate majority votes in the parliament.
- c. Establishment of unified municipalities.
- d. Unification of the judicial administration.
- e. Proportional participation of the two communities in the public service according to the population ratio.
- f. Abolition of the Greek communal chamber.

Makarios aimed at the establishment of a unitary state with majority rule; accordingly, some of the privileges of the Turkish Cypriots would be eliminated.

³¹ Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1997), 28.

³² Ibid.

The Turkish Government (on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot side, who had been expected) rejected Makarios' thirteen proposed amendments on 16 December 1963. There was a list of problems between the two communities, which both sides were reluctant to resolve.

First, Makarios, according to the Turkish view, disregarded the provisions of the 1959-1960 Accords, which guaranteed the Turkish minority "fair" representation in the civil services. However, it is worth mentioning that the aforementioned representation did not reflect the actual proportion of the population on the island. The percentage ratio of representation of the two Cypriot communities within the civil services was 70 to 30 (Greeks-Turks), while corresponding ratio among the population was 80 to 20.³³

Second, there were problems with the structure of the Cypriot army. While the Vice President, Dr. Fazil Kutchuk, strived to preserve (as provided by the London-Zurich Accords) a 40 percent Turkish presence within the national army, president Makarios supported the idea of an integrated force, with no established proportion.

Third, Makarios opposed separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot City councils, guaranteed by the constitution. He would only accept common representation in the councils.

Finally, there were deep differences over the country's foreign policy. The Turkish minority favored a pro-western foreign policy, whereas Makarios was more inclined to either a non-aligned or pro-Soviet attitude, and to good relations with the non-aligned Afro-Asian nations.

³³ C. M. Woodhouse, *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1985), 4.

Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriots were superior in terms of firepower and numbers. Therefore, due to the reluctance of the Turkish Cypriot side to negotiate these problems with the Greek Cypriot side, Makarios and his Cabinet in December 1963 sanctioned the imposition of the Greek Cypriot settlement of the dispute through violence.³⁴

³⁴ Brian Lapping, *End of Empire* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 350.

III. THE FIRST CRISIS (DECEMBER 1963-JUNE 1964)

A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SITUATION

The already tense situation on Cyprus exploded on 5 December 1963, when Makarios informed the guarantor powers of the London-Zurich Accords (Britain, Greece and Turkey) of his intention to change the country's constitution. He had decided both to abolish the 70:30 ethnic ratio in the civil services and to unify the city councils. Both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots sought help from their respective mainlands to settle the dispute by force.³⁵ Consequently, Makarios' action formally constituting a violation of the London-Zurich Accords, gave the guarantor powers the right to intervene and restore the previous *status quo*. Moreover, the Turkish Government (representing the Turkish Cypriot side) rejected Makarios' thirteen proposed amendments on 16 December 1963. The problems between the two communities seemed to be bridgeless.

Almost two weeks after Makarios' declaration of constitutional changes, attacks by Greek Cypriot extremists against a Turkish quarter in Nicosia (the capital) triggered civil war. On 21 December 1963, heavy intercommunal fighting broke out following Makarios' declarations. Four days of violence ensued, with almost 500 Cypriots killed before the establishment of a Christmas Day cease-fire.³⁶

The situation, if left to evolve by itself, would clearly have favored the more heavily armed and more efficiently organized Greek majority. Therefore, Turkey reacted

³⁵ C. M. Woodhouse, *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1985), 4.

³⁶ Iverson MacAdam, "Cyprus," *The Annual Register of World Events: A review of the Year 1963* 205 (1963): 129.

immediately; it sent urgent messages to London and Athens asking for cooperation to restrain the Greek Cypriots from attacking the Turkish minority further. Moreover, Turkey appealed to the U.S. and other Western states to intervene and stop violence on the island. The Greek government, in contrast, was reluctant to condemn overtly the Greek-Cypriot aggressiveness.

However, Turkey's cooperative mood turned to hostility against the Greek Cypriots when joint appeals from the guarantor powers were dismissed by the Greek Cypriot side. It was clear then that Turkey intended to take military action in order to restore the previous *status quo*. Judging from the outcome, it would certainly have been a chance for Turkey to set foot on Cyprus and militarily support the Turkish Cypriot position. Dean Rusk, the U.S. Secretary of State during the Johnson administration, acknowledged this on March 11.³⁷

During the negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the dispute, the Cyprus Government appeared willing to accept the intervention of a force consisting of the troops of the three guarantor powers (Britain-Greece-Turkey), who were already on the island to restore peace. Due to the threat of Turkish military intervention, the Greek Cypriots also expressed reservations to the UN Security Council, which adjourned the case.

On 30 December 1963, the Cypriot Foreign Minister, Dr. Spyridon Kyprianou, proposed the ending of treaty links with Greece and Turkey, retaining them only with Britain in the context of the Commonwealth. He also declared that *enosis* (with Greece) was unattainable but partition, which Dr. Kutchuk had proposed, was out of the

³⁷ Michael R. Beschloss, *Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963-64* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 282.

question.³⁸ It was obvious that as violence spread over Cyprus, the explosive situation on the island begged for mediation.

B. EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE – THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

During the post-World War II period up to the 1960s (Cyprus' independence), almost twenty states around the world acquired independence and sovereignty (Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, India, etc.). These changes, inevitably predisposed all the politicians and diplomats who were directly or indirectly involved with the Cyprus crisis. Another significant evolution involved with state-formation process was the creation through dynamic means and the recognition internationally, of the state of Israel.

In this political context in January 1964, intense international diplomatic activity concerning the Cyprus dispute took place between Washington, London, Ankara, Athens, Nicosia, and the United Nations Headquarters. The U.S. leaders considered the situation in Cyprus the most serious international crisis since the Cuban missile crisis.³⁹ Thus, despite its initial reservations about being actively involved, the United States was quickly embroiled in the Cyprus problem.

The U.S. foreign policy concerning the East Mediterranean region at the time was clear: it wished the Soviet containment within the Black Sea. The problem occurred in

³⁸ Ivison Macadam, *The Annual Register of World Events: A Review of the Year 1963*, (London: Longmans, Green and Co Ltd, 1964), 129.

³⁹ James A. Bill, *George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Michigan: Book Crafters, Inc., 1997), 183.

the midst (and maybe the peak) of the Cold War. Soviet Union had been a traditional enemy of Turkey, and further, the Kremlin had set eyes on the Mediterranean and the Middle East.⁴⁰ A potential legitimate Soviet presence in the eastern Mediterranean region (i.e., on Cyprus) would undoubtedly attenuate NATO's southeastern flank. Furthermore, a potential confrontation between Greece and Turkey (two U.S.-NATO allies) might cause a defense vacuum of NATO's southeast flank, and put NATO's cohesion in question.

President Johnson continued President Kennedy's policies concerning the Middle East upon his assumption of office. His general principle was to cultivate an alliance with Turkey,⁴¹ but at the same time to cope with Greece's demands. Moreover, President Johnson was more preoccupied with the promotion of his domestic, social and economic reforms (the "Great Society") than with the U.S. foreign policy.⁴² The latter was a task assigned to Secretary of State Dean Rusk and his office.⁴³

With respect specifically to the U.S. foreign policy concerning Cyprus, President Johnson had assigned it as the primary responsibility of Under Secretary of State George Ball.⁴⁴ The columnist Ted Lewis had characteristically written in the *New York Daily News*: "The President is said ... to be more interested right now in projecting a favorable

⁴⁰ Ihsan Gürkan, *NATO, Turkey, and the Southern Flank: A Mideastern Perspective*, (New York: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1980), 40.

⁴¹ George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), 91.

⁴² William A. DeGregorio, *The Complete Book of U.S. Presidents*, 5th ed. (New York: Wings Books, 1997), 574.

⁴³ James A. Bill, *George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Michigan: Book Crafters, Inc., 1997), 71.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, xv.

image before the public than in activities which would improve his knowledge of world problems."⁴⁵

Nonetheless, the Cyprus crisis might have threatened U.S. security indirectly by affecting the integrity of the North Atlantic alliance. Moreover, the major disputants in the Cyprus crisis were two U.S. allies. By backing one of them, the U.S. would raise not only grievances, but also potentially reactions against the cohesion of the NATO alliance from the other. On the other hand, Greece and Turkey were susceptible to U.S. political influence mainly because both countries had been U.S. foreign aid recipients since the end of World War II, and both depended heavily on U.S. aid to build their respective economic infrastructures.⁴⁶

Additionally, Turkey was even more susceptible to U.S. policy as one of its basic goals concerning international relations was the "Kemalist dream," which was that the Turkish Republic would be classified as a European (and in extension pro-Western) state. Thus, Turkey's close ties with the United States in the post-World War II period were probably part of an attempt to realize Ataturk's "sacred" dream.⁴⁷ Furthermore, the U.S. was the most attractive pole for Turkey during the Cold War, since the latter was clearly now an enemy of the opposite pole, the U.S.S.R., a traditional Turkish enemy.

⁴⁵ Michael R. Beschloss, *Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963-64*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 225.

⁴⁶ David E. Long and Bernard Reich, *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa*, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), 18.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 31.

After World War II, the Soviet foreign policy aimed at the extension of its influence and control in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East regions.⁴⁸ Thus, modern Turkey's affinity towards the Western alliance was an unmistakable characteristic of the country's foreign policy. Accordingly, the country's accession to NATO had been accepted by the Turks without reservations.⁴⁹ Finally, during the Cyprus crisis of 1964, the Turkish government was the holdover of the 1960 military coup, and therefore was mostly preoccupied with domestic problems rather than with devising major foreign initiatives.⁵⁰

Both the British and the Turks hoped for U.S. mediation in the dispute over Cyprus. The British did not want to interfere anymore with Cyprus' affairs (they had recently decided to relinquish control over Cyprus), and the Turks believed that the American posture would be decisive in resolving the situation.⁵¹ If the American diplomatic efforts were unsuccessful however, Turkey would probably have taken legitimately military action to restore the previous *status quo* of Cyprus.

Initial conversations between the Under Secretary of State Ball and Sir David Ormsby-Gore, the British ambassador to Washington, demonstrated that Britain was only willing to act in a more general context of power structure, like that of NATO. Sir Ormsby-Gore made also clear that Britain did not wish the resolution of the problem to involve any United Nations force.⁵² That, according to the British ambassador, would

⁴⁸ Ihsan Gürkan, *NATO, Turkey, and the Southern Flank: A Mideastern Perspective*, (New York: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1980), vii.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 32.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), 94.

⁵² *Ibid.*

have delayed the resolution and provided the Soviet Union (acting under the UN flag) with the chance to involve itself actively in the conflict. Furthermore, it would legitimize a Soviet presence in the East Mediterranean area. Moreover, the British, who had retained two military bases on Cyprus, were reluctant to fulfill their obligation (under the terms of the previously mentioned Treaty of Guarantee) to safeguard the constitution and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.⁵³

However, the first serious reaction to the Cyprus events of December 1963 came from Great Britain. In an effort at a compromise between the two Cypriot communities, Britain called for a meeting of all the interested parties. Accordingly, representatives both of the guarantor of the London Accords powers and of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots met in London on 15 January 1963. From the beginning it appeared that there would be a deadlock. The Greek Cypriots argued for "a completely independent state of Cyprus in which the [Greek] majority should rule and the rights of the [Turkish] minority would be safeguarded." On the other side, Turkish Cypriots supported partition of the island and self-administration of their own section (thus opening the way for Cyprus' annexation to Turkey).

On January 25, 1964, Ball posed the problem of the U.S. response to the Cyprus dispute to President Johnson. The president asked for Ball's suggestion, which was threefold:⁵⁴

- a. The creation of an international peace-restoring force that would include American (no more than 1,200 men) and British troops.

⁵³ George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), 94.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

- b. A pledge of non-intervention in Cyprus for three months from both Greece and Turkey.
- c. The appointment of a NATO mediator.

Ball's proposal leaked prematurely, and Makarios rejected the idea of a resolution achieved through NATO mediation and intervention. The Archbishop made clear, rather, that he favored a United Nations approach to the resolution of the problem.

Following the actual deadlock of London, the British, on 26 January, appealed for assistance from the U.S., France, Italy and West Germany to resolve the situation. Britain argued the following:

- a. That its military commitments in Malaysia and East Africa made it difficult to maintain the British force in Cyprus without outside assistance.
- b. That Cyprus was actually a NATO problem because the dispute could bring Greece and Turkey (both NATO members) into a military confrontation.

Following Makarios' aforementioned disagreement, the U.S. was initially reluctant to join a "Cyprus peace force,"⁵⁵ even if it were to act under NATO's flag. However, U.S. opposition to a NATO-force plan (which was suggested by Britain) were overcome. In talks held in London on 26-27 January between the U.S. Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy (on his way back to Washington from a Malaysian peace mission), and the British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the U.S. agreed to a joint NATO intervention demanding the fulfillment of two conditions:⁵⁶

⁵⁵ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 24, no. 1214 (January 30-February 5, 1964): 33.

⁵⁶ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 24, no. 1214 (January 30-February 5, 1964): 33.

- a. The Cyprus government's approval of the NATO force.
- b. A British, Greek and Turkish agreement to a three-month suspension of their right to intervene militarily in Cyprus.

On December 30, the British, in an effort to control the increasingly violent situation between the two communities co-existing on Cyprus, established a buffer zone, the so-called since then "Green Line." It divided the Cypriot territory into two parts and its purpose was to stave off the two fighting Cypriot communities.⁵⁷ The "Green Line" took its name after the color of the pen that the British military commander of Cyprus had used to draw it on the map.⁵⁸

The U.S. and Britain, having overcome the aforementioned obstacles jointly proposed a plan on 31 January 1963. According to this plan, a NATO force of at least 10,000 troops (including U.S. soldiers) would maintain peace on Cyprus. Greece immediately accepted the plan, and Turkey approved it the following day. Makarios, whose agreement was required for the proposal's implementation, gave conditional approval four days later. The principal points of the Anglo-US peace-force plan were as follows:⁵⁹

- a. One battalion of combat troops would be drawn from each NATO country, with the exception of Britain, Greece and Turkey, the three guarantors of Cyprus' independence. The U.S. contingent would be made up of a combat battalion of 1,200 men and as many support troops as would be

⁵⁷ Brian Lapping, *End of Empire* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 350.

⁵⁸ "Cyprus: Chronology of Events: 1960-1969" (No date), Available [Online]: <<http://www.glavx.org/cyprus/chrono/1960-69/1960-69.htm>>, published by the Speros Basil Vryonis Center for the Study of Hellenism [23 August 1998].

⁵⁹ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 24, no. 1214 (January 30-February 5, 1964): 33.

necessary. The NATO units would reinforce both the 2,700 British troops that were currently on patrol duty in Cyprus and the Greek and Turkish soldiers, all of whom were there under the terms of Cyprus' 1960 independence treaty.

- b. The NATO force, to be commanded by a Briton, would remain in Cyprus no longer than 3 months. During this period Britain, Greece and Turkey would forego their right to intervene militarily.
- c. A mediator would be chosen from a NATO country (excluding Britain, Greece, Turkey or the U.S.) to seek a political solution to the Greek-Turkish Cypriote dispute.
- d. The ambassadors of the contributing NATO nations would politically guide the force.

The Cypriot Foreign Minister, Spiros A. Kyprianou, said that a precondition of Makarios' acceptance of more foreign troops on the island would be a more detailed clarification of the exact role of the NATO forces. Kyprianou expressed his concern that the NATO units, unguided by detailed rules of operation, would be in no position to prevent Turkish troops from shielding a Turkish Cypriot population shift, thus paving the way for the eventual establishment of *de facto* partition of the island. Kyprianou also argued for a peace force that would act under the jurisdiction of the UN Security Council, which would appease the Cyprus government's anxiety over Turkey's intentions toward Cyprus.

Britain, Turkey and the United States opposed the UN Security Council role on the grounds that it would bring the Soviet Union into the controversy and possibly create

greater tensions not only between Greece and Turkey, but also between the two superpowers as well.

However, time was a critical factor in the resolution of the problem. On 28 January 1964, Ismet İnönü, the Turkish Prime Minister, sent an ultimatum to the U.S. through Raymond Hare, the U.S. ambassador in Ankara. İnönü warned that unless the U.S. reacted by the next morning in response to the Turkish request for the cessation of violence in Cyprus, Turkey would invade Cyprus to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority. The U.S. did not respond according to İnönü's ultimatum, and the violence in Cyprus intensified, this time including violence against the American Embassy in Nicosia.

On 5 February, France attenuated the Anglo-US plan by refusing to participate in the proposed NATO force for Cyprus. The basis for the French denial was that it could not join the force because Paris had not taken part in the drafting of the 1959 Treaty that led to the fighting between the two communities in Cyprus.

Therefore, Britain and the U.S., in order to overcome the objections of President Makarios, who had insisted that any outside force on Cyprus be under the authority of the UN Security Council, proposed a new plan on 6 February 1963. The new Anglo-US plan suggested the creation of an international military force in Cyprus, which would provide a UN "link" with the previously proposed NATO force. The plan also proposed that the UN would receive reports on the NATO force's actions, but would not have a substantial voice in its operations.

The Soviet Union rejected this plan on February 7,⁶⁰ and it warned that it would not tolerate any intervention by the Western powers in the Cyprus situation. The Soviet

⁶⁰ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 24, no. 1215 (February 6-12, 1964): 41.

warning was delivered in parallel notes sent by Prime Minister Khrushchev to President Johnson, President Makarios, the British Prime Minister Douglas-Home, the French President de Gaulle, the Greek Prime Minister John Paraskevopoulos and the Turkish Prime Minister Ismet İnönü respectively.

Hence, it was clear that the only viable proposition for resolving the dispute would have to involve the UN. The UN reactions to the Cyprus crisis up to that point had been moderate. The UN and Cypriot authorities had agreed in New York on January 16 to the stationing of a UN official in Cyprus that would observe the cease-fire of 24 December 1963. Accordingly, the UN Secretary General, U Thant, assigned the observer post to Lt. General Prem Singh Gyani of India, who had previously commanded the UN Emergency Force in Gaza.⁶¹ However, the UN did not formally react to the Anglo-US plan of 6 February.

Therefore, the United States decided to take the initiative. On 8 February Ball, acting under President Johnson's orders, initiated intensive diplomacy between London, Ankara, Athens, and Cyprus, through which he explored the guarantor powers of the London-Zurich's Accords views. The American Under Secretary of State, as previously mentioned, initially favored a non-U.S. intervention posture. However, since he became directly involved with the problem, he believed that only the United States had the power and international credibility to deter a war in the eastern Mediterranean.⁶²

Turkey's objectives according to its statesmen were as follows:

⁶¹ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 24, no. 1214 (January 30-February 5, 1964): 34.

⁶² James A. Bill, *George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Michigan: Book Crafters, Inc., 1997), 183.

- a. To provide for the establishment of an effective international peacekeeping force on Cyprus.
- b. To prevent *enosis* of Cyprus with Greece.
- c. To protect the Turkish-Cypriot minority.

In Greece, Ball found a weak caretaker government that could not play a decisive role in the dispute. Thus, the Greek government avoided making any serious commitments on the issue; hence, the United States would have to deal directly with Archbishop Makarios III.⁶³ When Ball, accompanied by the Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, came to the discussions with Makarios, he merely confirmed what Adlai Stevenson (the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations) had previously told him. Mr. Stevenson had sharply criticized Makarios in a conversation with Ball on 25 January 1964: "I know this son of a bitch....I stayed in his house....He has never been above spilling blood to accomplish his purpose."⁶⁴ Stevenson added that the only way to deal with Makarios was "to give 'the old bastard absolute hell.'"⁶⁵

The Cypriot president, according to Ball, was rather uncompromising, and only favored action based on a United Nations plan.⁶⁶ Ball was further outraged with Makarios' attitude concerning the ongoing violent incidents, and warned him that the world would not passively accept the situation in Cyprus.

It is worth mentioning here that Ball, having been informed about the Turkish intention to intervene militarily, put a lot of pressure on Makarios to accept the U.S. plan.

⁶³ Ibid., 184.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

He threatened Makarios that if the Turks invaded Cyprus “neither the U.S. nor any other Western power would raise a finger to stop them.”⁶⁷ Makarios however, having secured Soviet support in his potential confrontation with the West did not give in to Ball’s threats.⁶⁸ Finally, Ball wired President Johnson that “the Greek Cypriots *do not want a peace-keeping force*”⁶⁹ at all.

After his meeting with Makarios, Ball visited Ankara, where he met with Prime Minister İnönü and persuaded him to accept Makarios’ view: the presence of an UN-sponsored peace-restoring force in Cyprus. İnönü was reluctant to accept such an arrangement, rather preferring the resolution of the dispute to be assumed by a NATO force. However, he warned Ball that if violence against the Turkish minority in Cyprus continued, Turkey would act on her own.

Having in mind the consultations he had made, Ball, on his way back to Washington via London, proposed another alternative. His new suggestion was that an interim plan should be in force during the deliberations in the United Nations. The plan would include joint intervention of the three guarantor powers, as outlined in the London-Zurich Accords (Britain, Greece, and Turkey). As the Accords provided for such an arrangement, and thus, would not require Makarios’ consent, the arrangement would actively restore peace during the negotiations. Unfortunately for peaceful evolution of the situation, the British rejected Ball’s plan of a trilateral peacekeeping force.

⁶⁷ Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1997), 63.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), 96.

When he returned to Washington, Ball reported to President Johnson. The U.S. policy on the Cyprus issue consisted in evenhanded (i.e., towards the Greek and Turkish sides) efforts to restore peace, because of the explosive potential.⁷⁰ According to Washington, the coalescent dangers were twofold. First, the potential confrontation between Greece and Turkey would create a gap in NATO's southeastern shield. Second, Cyprus might overtly align with the Soviet Union, which would create another focal point for tension between the U.S. and U.S.S.R in the context of the Cold War.

There were already tangible indications of diplomacy between Cyprus and the Soviet Union. On 7 February 1964, the Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev notified President Johnson and other NATO leaders that NATO should not interfere with the resolution of the dispute.⁷¹

Since Ball was confronted with a passive posture from the British, (i.e., against action under the provisions of the London Accords) he resorted to a two-pronged strategy. First, he grudgingly proposed the U.S. acceptance of a potential United Nations mediation. Second, he called on Dean Acheson (and ultimately achieved his acceptance) to resume the role of mediator between the Greeks and the Turks. Acheson was an adept, experienced diplomat, and at the time enjoyed special credibility in both countries (Greece and Turkey) because of his support for the Truman Doctrine.⁷²

⁷⁰ James A. Bill, *George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Michigan: Book Crafters, Inc., 1997), 185.

⁷¹ George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), 94.

⁷² James A. Bill, *George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Michigan: Book Crafters, Inc., 1997), 185.

Ball, representing President Johnson, flew from Washington to visit the principal negotiators in the Cyprus dispute to press for acceptance of the proposed international force. On 8 February, he arrived in London, conferred with British officials, and then later with Kyprianou. Britain and the U.S. issued a modified plan in an effort to overcome the objections of all parties. The modified plan provided for the following:⁷³

- a. The inclusion in the force of soldiers from European countries outside NATO.
- b. The participation in the international force of Greek and Turkish troops that were regularly stationed in Cyprus.
- c. The attendance by a Cypriot government representative at the meetings of the political committee that was to advise the force's British commander.

Greece accepted the proposal but only on the condition that the Cypriot government approved it. Turkey also gave conditional approval, insisting that the principal function of the force be confined to maintaining security on Cyprus, pending a political settlement. Moreover, Turkey, which favored the partition of Cyprus, opposed Makarios' view that the peace force maintain the unity of the island.

The modified plan was presented in London on 10 February to the Cypriot Foreign Minister Spyridon Kyprianou, who then rejected it.⁷⁴ Kyprianou further reiterated Cyprus' previous demand that the peacekeeping force be answerable to the UN Security Council. One day later, the British Foreign Secretary, Richard A. Butler,

⁷³ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 24, no. 1215 (February 6-12, 1964): 41.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

discussed the Anglo-US proposal with UN Secretary General U Thant at UN headquarters in New York.

On 12-14 February, Makarios met in Nicosia with Ball and the British State Undersecretary for Commonwealth Relations, Sir Cyril Pickard. During the meetings, Makarios rejected the Anglo-US plan for an international force simply "linked" to the UN. On 13 February, Makarios justified his stance by declaring that "if these proposals were accepted the situation would be more complicated."⁷⁵ He further insisted on his previous demand that the composition of the proposed force should be approved in advance.⁷⁶ Makarios added, "When this is agreed upon, then we can discuss whether the force will be under full control of the [UN] Security Council or just linked with it." Offering a counter-proposal, the archbishop said he would prefer a peacekeeping force composed of British Commonwealth soldiers rather than the NATO units proposed by Britain and the United States.

Facing a deadlock, Britain and Cyprus requested an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council after the British and the U.S. failed to persuade Makarios to accept their plan. The aforementioned move represented for Britain a reversal of its policy on the Cyprus dispute. Britain had avouched that it no more wished to be actively involved in the dispute. It however, had been wary of a potential UN Security Council intervention, lest the Soviet Union use its veto power to block any peace moves. Under the previously mentioned considerations, President Johnson accepted the UN resolution that provided for the establishment of a UN-sponsored peacekeeping force on Cyprus.

⁷⁵ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 24, no. 1216 (February 13-19, 1964): 50.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

Accordingly, the U.S., which had initially opposed a UN Council session concerning the Cyprus issue, changed its position, and said in a statement made by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson that "Britain had asked for the meeting after full consultation with the United States."⁷⁷

At the same time, there were further developments in Cyprus. The Cypriot delegate to the UN, Zenon Rossides, in his request for a Security Council meeting on 15 February, warned that Cyprus faced an imminent invasion by Turkey. Ankara was reported, on 15 February, to have assured Britain and the U.S. that it would not intervene in Cyprus while peace efforts were in progress. The Turks, however, were said to have warned that they would invade if heavy fighting resumed between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

On 17 February 1964, Ball returned to Washington and reported to President Johnson. He said that the President agreed with him on the following that:⁷⁸

- a. "We [the U.S.] are faced with a situation of considerable gravity."
- b. It was "imperative that we take the necessary measures to restore peace and order" in Cyprus.

He further announced that the U.S. considered the peaceful settlement of the Cyprus dispute to be "essential to the peace of the world."⁷⁹

The UN Security Council met on 17 February, but quickly agreed to a 24-hour postponement in order to give UN Secretary General U Thant more time to devise a plan

⁷⁷ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 24, no. 1216 (February 13-19, 1964): 51.

⁷⁸ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 24, no. 1216 (February 13-19, 1964): 50-51.

⁷⁹ George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), 96.

for maintaining peace in Cyprus. The main points of U Thant's plan, submitted in a memo to Britain, Turkey, Greece, Cyprus and the U.S. were as follows:⁸⁰

- a. An international peacekeeping force should be formed with the consent of the four directly involved parties (Britain, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus) without formal authorization.
- b. On agreement, the Secretary General would report the force's formation to the UN Security Council; the Council would then adopt a resolution, taking note of the four-power agreement.
- c. If Britain, Turkey, Greece and Cyprus failed to agree upon a peace force, a mediator would be appointed to seek a solution within two weeks.
- d. The UN Secretary General or the Security Council President would issue a statement upholding Cyprus' independence and territorial integrity; such a statement would be aimed at satisfying Makarios' demands for a Council guarantee of his country's freedom.

The following day the Cypriot Foreign Minister, Spyros A. Kyprianou, rejected U Thant's proposal, insisting that the Cypriot government would only accept a plan through which the Security Council would guarantee Cyprus' territorial integrity.⁸¹ Kyprianou further pointed out that his government would accept nothing short of an outright Security Council guarantee of Cyprus' territorial integrity. The Turkish Ambassador to the U.S., Turgut Menemencioglu, expressed his government's opposition to a Security Council commitment on Cyprus. Menemencioglu said that Ankara sought a council

⁸⁰ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 24, no. 1216 (February 13-19, 1964): 51.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

resolution that would specifically endorse both Cyprus' constitution and the 1960 Treaty that guaranteed its independence.

Kyprianou, during the UN Security Council debate, read parts of a Turkish official document that suggested that Greek-Turkish clashes were provoking and creating a pretext for Turkish military intervention, which might result in the annexation of Cyprus. Menemencioglu called Kyprianou's accusation "distorted." The Turkish delegate countercharged that "Greek Cypriot terrorists" were planning a "hideous massacre" of Turkish Cypriots.

The British delegate to the UN, Patrick Dean, requested the following from the Security Council:⁸²

- a. To urge all parties in the controversy to confer with U Thant "to secure the establishment of an effective peacekeeping force as soon as possible."
- b. To appoint "an impartial mediator" to help work out a peace settlement.
- c. To call on all countries concerned to respect Cyprus' security "in accordance with the treaty of guarantee."

C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

While the diplomatic efforts of the United States, Britain, and the UN were in high gear, the situation in Cyprus was deteriorating and the Greek Cypriots intensified their attacks on several Turkish-inhabited areas. In the aforementioned diplomatic

⁸² "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 24, no. 1216 (February 13-19, 1964): 51.

process, the U.S. policy remained the policy of "evenhandedness," which was not appreciated by either the Greeks or the Turks.

In Greece, on the morrow of the February 1964 elections, anti-American hostility concluded with the burning of President Johnson's effigy.⁸³ Accordingly, the American president's feelings were hurt. Moreover, President Johnson was concerned about the adverse effects incidents like that might have on his image to the Greek-American voters in the upcoming American presidential elections in November 1964.⁸⁴ Furthermore, the Turkish press used the latter argument during anti-American demonstrations in Turkey to show why the American President acted "evenhandedly," also stressing that President Johnson's wife was a Greek-American.

On 29 February, the Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou, protested to the U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Henry R. Labouisse, by citing speeches made by U.S. officials. He particularly cited those made by the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai E. Stevenson, during the UN Security Council debate for the Cyprus problem, as being objectionable to Greece and the Greek Cypriots. Prime Minister Papandreou sent President Johnson a message in which he expressed the Greek hope that the U.S. would retain its traditional "aversion of any form of expediency in international life ... in resolving the problems confronting U.S."⁸⁵

⁸³ George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), 98.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 24, no. 1218 (February 27-March 4, 1964): 66.

On 4 March 1964, the Security Council issued resolution 186, in which it decided to create the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).⁸⁶ The aforementioned force would be composed of troops from Canada, Ireland, Sweden, Finland, and Britain, under the command of the Indian Lieutenant General Prem Singh Gyani. Its size was to be determined in consultation with Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and Britain, and would operate for a three-month period. The resolution also provided for the appointment of a UN mediator to seek a political solution to the dispute between the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus. The resolution was welcomed by the principal parties to the dispute (Greece, Turkey, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots). Although voting for the resolution, France, the U.S.S.R and Czechoslovakia objected in principle to granting U Thant control over the Cyprus force. President Johnson on the contrary, hailed the resolution as “a major step towards peace.”⁸⁷

However, the Turkish government in reality could not accept such arrangements. On 13 March, it sent a threatening note to President Makarios.⁸⁸ The note charged that Greek Cypriot “aggression against the Turks on the island has taken such a turn that it obliges all humanity to rebel.” Ankara demanded an end to “all kinds of individual or collective aggression, massacre, sacking, rebelling and rape and torture.” It insisted on “the lifting of all sieges, the granting of free movement, the release of hostages and the return of bodies of the slain [Turkish Cypriots].” The note warned that unless its demands were met, Turkey would “use its unilateral [military] intervention right” granted

⁸⁶ D. G. Redmond, “The Month in Review,” *Current History* 46, No273 (May 1964): 310.

⁸⁷ “Cyprus,” *Facts on File* 24, no. 1218 (February 27-March 4, 1964): 66.

⁸⁸ “Cyprus,” *Facts on File* 24, no. 1220 (March 12-18, 1964): 82.

by the agreement of August 1960. The Turkish note was also handed to the U.S., British and Greek Ambassadors in Ankara, and a copy was sent to U Thant. To back up its threats of an invasion, Turkey undertook the following military measures:⁸⁹

- a. Its air force assumed control of the civilian airfield of the Mediterranean port of Iskenderun.
- b. Jet planes made regular flights along the sea corridor between Turkey and Cyprus.
- c. Troops sealed off all roads leading to Iskenderun.
- d. An area just south of the airport was used as a staging area.
- e. Naval units were massed off the Turkish coast.

Makarios, who had been in Athens to attend the funeral of the King of Greece, King Paul, cut short his visit, returned to Nicosia, and ordered rejection of the Turkish note. The Turkish Ambassador to Cyprus, Mazhar Ozkol, refused to accept the Cyprus government's reply on the ground that Turkey "was not expecting an answer but simply wanted to know whether the Turkish government demands would be immediately fulfilled."

On 25 March 1964, UN Secretary General U Thant designated the Finnish ambassador to Sweden, Sakari S. Tuomioja, as the UN mediator between the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus. The UNFICYP troops arrived in Cyprus on 27 March 1964, and by the end of April, they numbered 7,500 men.⁹⁰ The UN force patrolled the "inter-communal" borderline between the two communities, joined by Greek-Cypriot

⁸⁹ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 24, no. 1220 (March 12-18, 1964): 82.

⁹⁰ George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), 97.

security units, a situation to which Turkey objected. Moreover, the UN peace-restoring task was not effectively attained. Increasing violence led to further polarization between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, with the side-effect that relations between Greece and Turkey deteriorated.

The political attitude of Greece was non-intervention, thus emphasizing the need for Cyprus to be actually granted its independence, not only on paper. One might argue that Greece had no reason to be worried because of the numerical superiority of the Greek Cypriot militants over their Turkish Cypriot counterparts. However, the Greek government was mostly concerned about the future evolution of the dispute. The Greek official foreign policy was that the Cyprus dispute was an internal problem between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots that had to be settled without any foreign intervention.⁹¹

Turkey, on the other hand, resented any potential UN mediation because it felt that if it were left alone (without any foreign intervention), they could settle the dispute by force of arms.⁹² As a result, it could impose a solution favorable for it.

On 8 April, the UN Undersecretary for Special Political Affairs, Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, arrived in Nicosia to confer with President Makarios and the Cypriot Vice-President, Mr. Kutchuk, on the UN's role in Cyprus. Four days later, Bunche ended his mission. Before leaving Cyprus, he called the Greek-Turkish Cypriot clashes "an incoherent war." He further claimed that UNFICYP's principal aim was to "get full hold on the situation" and stop the fighting.⁹³

⁹¹ Richard Clogg, and George Yannopoulos, *Greece Under Military Rule*, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1972), 235.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 237.

⁹³ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 24, no. 1224 (April 9-15, 1964): 113.

On April 13, the Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou, after conferring with Makarios in Athens, announced a campaign to seek complete independence for Cyprus through a self-determination procedure in a ten-point policy statement. The ten points were as follows:⁹⁴

- a. Greece supported the Greek Cypriots' "just struggle."
- b. "Greece's policy is peace, but in case of attack we shall defend ourselves."
- c. The 1960 Treaty that had established Cyprus as an independent state was inapplicable as proven by the fact that a UN force was on the island and a UN mediator had been appointed to seek a political solution.
- d. Makarios' termination of the common defense treaty between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus merely confirmed the reality of the situation.
- e. Greece supported the UN force in Cyprus and "agreed to bring the Greek army contingent [on Cyprus] under the order of UNFICYP's commander."
- f. "We shall support" the UN mediator in Cyprus.
- g. The "only possible solution to the Cyprus problem" would be "the application ... of the principles of international justice and a true democracy," a government in which "the small [Turkish] minority of 18 percent imposes its will on the majority of 80 percent is ... not a democracy. It is a conquest;" the rights of the Turkish minority on Cyprus could be safeguarded with the aid of the UN.
- h. The only solution to the problem was complete independence for Cyprus that would permit the island republic to determine its own future.

⁹⁴ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 24, no. 1224 (April 9-15, 1964): 113.

- i. The Cyprus situation would be placed before the UN General assembly if the UN mediator failed to find a solution.
- j. Greece's "keen desire is to preserve excellent relations with ... Turkey. We regret deeply anti-Greek measures adopted by the Turkish government."

However, in spite of the presence of the United Nations' force on Cyprus, Turkey continued to complain about the "genocide" of the Turkish minority committed by the Greek-Cypriots, and it also expressed its fears of total "annihilation." By mid-April 1964, the Turkish government proposed the federalization of the Republic of Cyprus. According to the Turkish proposal, Cyprus would be divided with 62 percent of its territory being under Greek and 38 percent Turkish control.⁹⁵

However, such an arrangement was inconsistent with the actual ethnic division of 80 percent Greeks and 20 percent Turks;⁹⁶ most certainly, the Greek side would reject the Turkish suggestion. Indeed, Makarios did reject the Turkish proposal, while the Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou insisted on full self-determination for Cyprus and the rejection of the London-Zurich agreements.

On 29 April, the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) (Britain, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan) convened in Washington, D.C., with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk attending the meeting.⁹⁷ The CENTO ministers called for an immediate end to the inter-communal strife on Cyprus. The meeting was disrupted by

⁹⁵ George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), 97.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 24, no. 1229 (May 14-20, 1964): 153.

the smaller states' warnings that they considered themselves as threatened by non-Communist neighbors as by the Soviet bloc. U.S. President Johnson conferred privately with the foreign ministers of each of the four visiting CENTO countries. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Feridun C. Erkin, after his meeting with President Johnson, pointed out that Turkey expected the UNFICYP to "intervene more actively" to restore order on Cyprus.

On 2 May, the NATO Council held a special session in Paris on the Cyprus issue by Turkish request. The Turkish Ambassador to NATO, Nuri Birgi, protested the attacks on Turkish Cypriots and charged the Greek government with encouraging and supporting the strife on Cyprus. The Greek Ambassador to NATO, Christos Palamas, responded with similar charges against Turkey. The Council took no action.⁹⁸

On 4 May, President Johnson sent Senator William J. Fulbright (D., Ark.), the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, as a special emissary to conduct shuttle diplomacy between Greece and Turkey. Senator Fulbright was assigned the duty to try to conciliate the two opposing sides. He had been ordered to convey the American concern over the continued Cyprus strife, but not to undertake substantive negotiations on the problem.⁹⁹ The Turkish press rejected Fulbright's mediation as biased.

Despite Senator Fulbright's insistence that he had made no proposals for ending the unrest on Cyprus, Turkish officials charged after his departure that he had suggested a settlement based on the physical transfer of the Turkish Cypriot community to Turkey. Senator Fulbright was informed by Turkish officials that the only settlement acceptable to

⁹⁸ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 24, no. 1228 (May 7-13, 1964): 146.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*: 145.

Turkey would be one based on partition of the island. Furthermore, despite the Senator's optimism about a definite settlement, the situation in Cyprus further deteriorated by the end of May. Turkey's response to the situation was an invasion of Cyprus planned for 4 June 1964.¹⁰⁰

On 11 May, U Thant appointed Galo Plaza Lasso, the ex-president of Ecuador, as the chief UN political representative for direct negotiations with the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus.¹⁰¹ Plaza was appointed under the Cyprus peace plan transmitted to the UN Security Council by U Thant on 29 April. The appointment of Plaza was intended to free Lt. General Prem Singh Gyani, the commander of UNFICYP, to conduct military matters only. UN officials said that the functions of Dr. Plaza would not conflict with those of Sakari S. Tuomioja, the UN mediator charged with seeking a long-term political solution to the Cyprus problem.

It soon became obvious that the American foreign policy of evenhandedness between the two disputing sides and of peaceful compromise without essentially resolving the problem would be ineffective as far as a permanent solution was concerned. A dead end was reached in the beginning of June 1964, when Turkey decided to intervene militarily and to resolve the dispute by means of its military might.¹⁰²

Following the Turkish threats for military intervention, the Cypriot parliament (boycotted by Turkish Cypriot representatives) passed controversial measures calling for the following:¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), 97.

¹⁰¹ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 24, no. 1228 (May 7-13, 1964): 145.

¹⁰² Charles Foley and W. I. Scobie, *The Struggle for Cyprus* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1975), 163.

¹⁰³ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 24, no. 1232 (June 4-10, 1964): 182.

- a. The conscription of 25,000 men into the National Guard.
- b. The unification of the police and the *gendarmarie* into one force.
- c. The purchase of heavy arms from abroad.

The Cypriot Vice-President Fazil Kutchuk, leader of the Turkish Cypriots, vetoed the bills in a letter sent to Makarios. Britain, Turkey and Greece criticized all three measures.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the U.S. considered the grave potential military confrontation between Greece and Turkey. Such an evolution in times of the Cold War could be dangerous for the stability of the southeastern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance. The U.S. had to respond decisively in order to ward this danger off.

Accordingly, President Johnson took the initiative without informing Under Secretary Ball, the American politician who directly involved with the problem. The U.S. President, assisted by Secretary of State Rusk and the latter's foreign-policy team (Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland and his deputy, Joseph Sisco), sent a presidential note to Turkish Prime Minister İnönü on 4 June 1964. Through the note, President Johnson did the following:¹⁰⁴

- a. He admonished Turkey to abide by the terms of the London-Zurich agreements.
- b. He criticized Turkey for not consulting with Washington, who was acting as the principal mediator.
- c. He urged Turkey to conform to the provisions of NATO.

¹⁰⁴ Ralph H. Magnus, *Documents on the Middle East*, (Washington, D. C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1969), 128-130.

- d. He indirectly threatened Turkey that NATO would not support Turkey in case of Soviet aggression, if Turkey intervened militarily in Cyprus.
- e. He reminded Turkey of the terms under which American military aid was provided to Turkey, according to which Turkey could use it only for defense purposes against Russia.

President Johnson's note clearly demonstrated a tilt of the American foreign policy that counteracted Turkish aggressive plans. The U.S. President soundly had foreseen (as the evolution of the dispute had demonstrated) that Turkey, by intervening, wished for the partition of Cyprus. This partition was definitely forbidden by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, though Turkey had the right to restore the previous *status quo* by unilaterally intervening. One of the Turkish grievances that followed was that President Johnson's note had not emphasized that the crisis was the result of Greek-Cypriot aggressiveness.

It should be noted, however, that the U.S. issued no warning to the Greek side. During national elections that were held on 16 February 1964, George Papandreou, who later won, had openly promised military support to the Greek Cypriots.¹⁰⁵ The Greek Prime Minister made these declarations under pressure from two factors. First, he was struggling for survival within a hitherto conservative political environment.¹⁰⁶ Second, he acted under the pressure of a threatened Turkish military intervention in Cyprus.

In addition to President Johnson's note, General Lyman Lemnitzer (NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe acting also as U.S.-Commander-in-Chief,

¹⁰⁵ C. M. Woodhouse, *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels*, (New York: Franklin Watts, 1985), 3.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

European Command), acting under the U.S. president's direct order traveled to Ankara, where he persuaded İnönü to postpone the planned invasion indefinitely.¹⁰⁷ Following the alleged U.S. anti-Turkish policy, İnönü felt the need, and indeed announced publicly the substance of the Johnson's "presidential communication"¹⁰⁸ on the issue of Cyprus.

The anti-American psychological explosion that followed in Turkey was brought to President Johnson's attention. The popular anti-American sentiments of Turks combined with the strategic importance of Turkey for the American interests in the wider Middle East area compelled the U.S. president to ease his tight position *vis-à-vis* Turkey. Hence, he ordered Under Secretary of State George Ball to travel to Ankara in an effort to appease the Turks and to reassure İnönü of America's friendship.

On his way to Ankara, Ball, who had foreseen the unfavorable evolution of the presidential notewith respect to U.S. foreign relations with Turkey, stopped in Athens, where he blamed Greece for the rather eruptive situation on Cyprus.¹⁰⁹ Mr. Ball's mission was successful in terms of improving the relationship between the two countries (Turkey and the U.S.), and concluded with the invitation of İnönü to Washington D.C. for direct talks with the American President. Thus, President Johnson would attempt to appease the Turkish Prime Minister in person.

The Turkish Prime Minister accepted the invitation, but before his visit to Washington, he responded rather bitterly to President Johnson's note. In a message to the American President dated 13 June 1964, İnönü was quite resentful of the United States

¹⁰⁷ George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), 100.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, 101.

foreign policy achievements. He initially expressed his disappointment for President Johnson's note, he defended his country's foreign policy, then he lashed out against the Greek side, and finally he indirectly threatened President Johnson about the NATO cohesiveness, by questioning the organization's own existence. Expressed in a lengthy response, İnönü's main points were as follows:¹¹⁰

- a. Turkey had consulted four times since the end of 1963 with the U.S., the United Nations, and the guarantor powers of the London Treaty on the course of action.
- b. Turkey, urged by the U.S. and expecting that the UN measures in Cyprus would be effective, had repeatedly refrained from the planned intervention (thus, he emphasized UN ineffectiveness).
- c. He pointed out the growing aggressiveness of Makarios' regime with the tacit approval of the Greek government, and the intensification of Greek-Cypriot "terror" against the Turkish Cypriot minority.
- d. He further emphasized the Turkish right of unilateral intervention that Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 provided for.
- e. He denied that the purpose of the potential Turkish intervention was the partition of Cyprus, and indicated that a Greek-Turkish war, to which Secretary of State Dean Rusk had referred to as "literally unthinkable,"¹¹¹ was only possible if Greece attacked Turkey.

¹¹⁰ Ralph H. Magnus, *Documents on the Middle East*, (Washington, D. C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1969), 130-131.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 133.

- f. Finally, İnönü reminded Johnson that Turkey acted according to the NATO Ministerial Council's decision in the Hague in late April 1964. Furthermore, he argued that if NATO's support for one of the members of the alliance would not be provided unconditionally against the Soviet threat, the use of the alliance was questionable.

İnönü had used bold language; nevertheless, the letter of İnönü to President Johnson substantially put an end to the Cyprus crisis of 1964.

D. CONCLUSIONS

The United States intervened in the Cyprus dispute to replace Britain, since in the absence of western-oriented support for the island, it would revert to the Soviet sphere of influence. The primary objectives of the U.S. diplomacy were to restore peace, contain the conflict, prevent a military confrontation between Greece and Turkey, and advance a settlement that would safeguard Western interests in the east Mediterranean region.

Judging from the outcome, one might argue that the United States' intervention was half-successful. It achieved the prevention of a Greco-Turkish war, and the western power structure remained unaltered. However, it had several consequences that would inevitably impose burdens in the course of the endless dispute.

First, by favoring the Turkish Turkish-Cypriot views about the methodology of a peaceful resolution of the dispute, U.S. foreign policy caused the emergence of anti-American feelings in Greece. Moreover, by dealing directly with Makarios over the

problem, it made the Greek government lose confidence in the U.S. in terms of how much it trusted the former to deal with such serious problems.

Second, the Johnson letter caused anti-Americanism in Turkey. There was an increasing public tendency in Turkey to intervene militarily in Cyprus.¹¹²

Third, it further entangled the Soviets in the dispute. The U.S., by putting too much pressure on the Cypriot president, made clear the anxiety of the U.S. to resolve the problem as quickly as possible. Makarios' posture, however, brought the issue to the United Nations, and more specifically to the UN Security Council, in which the U.S.S.R. played an integral role.

Fourth, it posed a burden on the bilateral good relations (which had been established after the application of the Truman doctrine) between the U.S. with Greece and Turkey, respectively. The Greek and Turkish governments and peoples were all unsatisfied with the United States posture on the issue.

Fifth, it established the United States as the successor of the British concerning the influence of the western power structure in the wider east Mediterranean area. It was the first time after the end of World War II that a great power was required to intervene decisively in this region. Nevertheless, this time, the U.S. played this role instead of Britain, the traditionally established "policeman" of the area.

Sixth, by maintaining a policy of evenhandedness in the process of the dispute, it inevitably alienated the supporters within the Cypriot population of a western orientation

¹¹² James A. Bill, *George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Michigan: Book Crafters, Inc., 1997), 183.

in Cypriot policy. Therefore, those who expected a decisive U.S. intervention that would resolve and finally settle the dispute, remained unappeased and fell silent.

Finally, the most severe development was the turn of events concerning the definite settlement of the dispute. While the United States was actively involved with the issue and could effectively use its influence to persuade the participants directly involved for a permanent solution, it did not. Therefore, U.S. indecisiveness concluded in perpetuating the dispute, with poor prospects for a permanent settlement.

IV. THE PERIOD BETWEEN JUNE 1964 AND JULY 1974

A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SITUATION

Along with heightened tensions between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities followed by diplomatic mobility concerning a potential solution to the Cyprus problem, the period under consideration included major political developments in Greece and Turkey.

During the mid-1960s, the political situation in Greece destabilized. The government of George Papandreou fell under pressure from the royalists and the palace. The period of smooth political affairs that followed ended abruptly after an unanticipated military coup under the leadership of Colonel George Papadopoulos on 21 April 1967. One might argue that the takeover by the junta would later be proven catalytic for the evolution of the Cyprus problem. The Europeans considered the political situation in Greece unstable, as one would not expect the country's problem as a whole to be settled by a non-democratically imposed government, at least not permanently.

In November 1973, the Colonels' regime was overthrown by the Chief of Military Police, Dimitrios Ioannides. Ioannides' regime was even more oppressive than that of its predecessors. The new dictator had served in Cyprus during the 1964 troubles, and hated both Makarios and the Turkish Cypriots with equal intensity.¹¹³ Ioannides' regime led both Greece and Cyprus to the imbroglio of July 1974.

¹¹³ Robert McDonald, "The Problem of Cyprus," *Adelphi Papers* 234 (winter 1988/9): 17.

The political situation during the period under consideration in Turkey was not far better than that of Greece. The country had already experienced a military coup in May 1960, which had overthrown the civilian Bayar-Menderes government.¹¹⁴ In 1971, deteriorating socio-political and economic conditions in Turkey led to a military "coup by memorandum" that forced the Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel resign. The "silent" military intervention of 1971 concluded with the establishment of supra-party governments. Thereafter and up to 1980, successive coalition governments took over Turkish politics,¹¹⁵ all of which were in effect monitored by the Turkish military leadership. Therefore, in the milestone summer of 1974, a rather weak coalition government¹¹⁶ under the presidency of Bulent Ecevit was in charge of the political affairs of Turkey. The existence of a weak Turkish government combined with mounting nationalism in Turkey put pressure on the Turkish government to act drastically in Cyprus in July 1974, when the circumstances were proper.

The political coincidences of July 1974 had indeed created an appropriate opportunity for the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. First, President Makarios was overthrown in Cyprus. Second, the political situation of Greece was quite unstable, and there would be no substantial Greek reaction expected against any Turkish military operation. Third, Turkish nationalism would permit a military intervention in Cyprus. Finally, the political situation of the United States would permit the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The U.S. President Nixon was confronting the Watergate scandal and an

¹¹⁴ Graham E. Fuller, and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), 8.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹¹⁶ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 274.

impeachment process. Hence, decisive U.S. intervention like the "Johnson's letter" of 1964 would be rather unlikely. Nevertheless, it is imperative to examine the evolution of the dispute over Cyprus between June 1964 and July 1974 in order to understand how diplomacy failed and led to Turkish military action in Cyprus in July and August 1974.

B. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS FOR RESOLUTION AND THE U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE PROBLEM

As previously mentioned, although Johnson's letter to İnönü on 4 June 1964 forestalled a Turkish invasion of Cyprus, it alienated the Turks as well. From a United States strategic point of view, the cost of such an outcome for the U.S. foreign policy was too high. Turkey was too important a country for U.S. national interests to alienate it. It was a NATO ally, a neighbor of the U.S.S.R, an important regional power, and a Middle Eastern country. Therefore, the U.S. Under Secretary of State, George Ball flew to Ankara to try to placate the Turkish Prime Minister İnönü.

Having failed to achieve the goal of his trip to Ankara, Ball, on 11 June 1964, proposed to President Johnson to invite both the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers to Washington for separate meetings.¹¹⁷ The purpose of the meetings would be to attempt a rapprochement of the two disputing sides, which in turn would iron out their differences. Accordingly, the two Prime Ministers were invited, as Ball had suggested, and met with

¹¹⁷ James A. Bill, *George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Michigan: Book Crafters, Inc., 1997), 186.

President Johnson on 22 and 24 June respectively. The meetings failed to defuse the situation, and Ball decided to shift tactics in solving the problem.¹¹⁸

The U.S. Under Secretary of State decided to find a person, respected by both the Greeks and Turks, who would mediate a solution to the Cyprus problem at meetings of Greek and Turkish representatives in the United States. The appropriate person for this post would be Dean Acheson. Acheson was a well-versed diplomat, and again, enjoyed special credibility in both Greece and Turkey because of his support for the Truman doctrine.¹¹⁹

However, such a suggestion would inevitably cause friction among several parties interested in the Cyprus problem. The reasons were twofold. First, the Greeks and the Cypriots would not accept a solution mediated by any organization other than the United Nations. Second, throughout the Cyprus crisis, Acheson and the United Nations became entangled and occasionally competed with one another.¹²⁰ Consequently, UN Secretary General U Thant objected to the Ball proposition. Ball retreated and accepted that the meetings be held in Geneva under UN auspices, but Acheson would have to attend the meetings.

The meetings were initiated in Geneva on 4 July 1964, and lasted for eight weeks. Throughout the Geneva Convention of July 1964, Ball was aware and supported Acheson's position.¹²¹ From these meetings emerged what became known as the

¹¹⁸ James A. Bill, *George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Michigan: Book Crafters, Inc., 1997), 186.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid., 187.

Acheson Plan. The plan proposed "double *enosis*," which would substantially partition Cyprus. According to the plan:¹²²

- a. Cyprus would be divided into eight cantons, with two of them reserved for the Turkish Cypriots.
- b. Greek Cypriots would have *enosis* with Greece.
- c. Greece was to award the Aegean island of Kastellorizon to Turkey and compensate Turkish Cypriots wishing to emigrate.
- d. A sovereign Turkish military base area was to be provided on Cyprus.

As expected, the Acheson plan was opposed by both the Greeks and the Turks. The Greek side and Makarios rejected the plan because it called for what he saw as a modified form of partition, which in their perception was the Turkish goal. The Turks on the other hand, would not give up their perceived "rights" on Cyprus for such a tiny island as Kastellorizon. Therefore, Acheson realized that his proposed plan was doomed from the time it was set on the negotiating table.

The Geneva meetings were further doomed to failure in August 1964, when after Greek Cypriots had attacked the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey responded by attacking Greek Cypriot towns by air.¹²³ Finally, the meetings in Geneva produced no results at all, and Acheson returned to Washington in early September. His perception of the situation was that there was no solution to the Cyprus problem, and that Turkey would continue planning to invade Cyprus.¹²⁴

¹²² James A. Bill, *George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Michigan: Book Crafters, Inc., 1997), 187.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

The fighting on Cyprus then escalated further with the Greek Cypriots attacking the Turkish Cypriots, and the Turkish air force then attacking Greek Cypriot towns; the situation was deteriorating. Tensions eased only after the United States transmitted a series of toughly worded messages, and the Soviet Union issued a warning to Makarios.¹²⁵ The Greek Cypriots and Turkey agreed to a UN-sponsored cease-fire, and all-out warfare was averted. With the UNFICYP watching over the cease-fire on Cyprus, the island Republic entered a period of uneasy stability that would last for a decade.

Nevertheless, a minor crisis occurred three years later in 1967. In April of that year, a conspiracy of Greek Colonels carried out a *coup d'etat* that overthrew the elected government in Greece and established a right-wing military junta. At the time, the military regime was divided with respect to the Greek posture on the Cyprus issue. There were those who supported a direct military confrontation with Turkey to attain union with Cyprus, and those who felt that the best solution to the Cyprus problem would be achieved by neutralizing Makarios and undertaking direct negotiations with Turkey.¹²⁶

George Papadopoulos, the junta leader, having been confronted with skepticism by the U.S. and NATO, anxious to curry favor with the west, favored of the latter approach.¹²⁷ Accordingly, in September 1967, the military junta met with Turkish leaders, and tried to make certain concessions to Turkey in exchange for *enosis* of Cyprus with Greece. The outcome of the summit was devastating. Turkey had become suspicious of Greece since the previous Greek government of Prime Minister

¹²⁵ James A. Bill, *George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Michigan: Book Crafters, Inc., 1997), 187.

¹²⁶ Robert McDonald, "The Problem of Cyprus," *Adelphi Papers* 234 (winter 1988/9): 15.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

Stephanopoulos avoided the issue of *enosis*. Moreover, the Turkish goal included a demand for a form of joint sovereignty over Cyprus, which was unacceptable to Greece. As a result, the meeting collapsed in acridity.¹²⁸

In Cyprus, General Grivas felt that the establishment of the junta in Greece, which carried nationalistic overtones, would support his struggle. Consequently, to reassert the authority of the Greek-Cypriot police, Grivas launched an attack on a Turkish enclave of the villages of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou, about twenty-five kilometers southwest of Larnaca.¹²⁹

Turkey's reaction was instantaneous; it issued an ultimatum and threatened to intervene by force to protect Turkish Cypriots. To back up their demands, the Turks massed troops on the Thracian border separating Greece and Turkey and began assembling an amphibious invasion force. The ultimatum's conditions included the expulsion of Grivas from Cyprus, the removal of Greek troops from Cyprus, the payment of indemnity for the casualties at Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou, the cessation of pressure on the Turkish Cypriot community, and the disbanding of the National Guard.¹³⁰ Ankara mobilized intending to invade Cyprus, but the invasion was postponed due only to heavy storms.¹³¹ Greece also mobilized to repel the Turkish invasion by enhancing the Cypriot defense.

¹²⁸ Robert McDonald, "The Problem of Cyprus," *Adelphi Papers* 234 (winter 1988/9): 15.

¹²⁹ Brian Lapping, *End of Empire* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 351.

¹³⁰ Robert McDonald, "The Problem of Cyprus," *Adelphi Papers* 234 (winter 1988/9): 15.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

The situation was only defused when the U.S. presidential envoy, Cyrus Vance, carried out exhausting shuttle diplomacy. Mr. Vance was assisted by interventions of the UN special envoy, Jose Rolz-Bennett, and NATO's Secretary General, Manlio Brosio.¹³²

Grivas resigned as commander of the Greek Cypriot forces on 20 November 1967 and left the island. Greece agreed to withdraw its forces from Cyprus except for the contingent allowed by the 1960 treaties, provided that Turkey did the same and also dismantled its invasion force. Turkey agreed, and the crisis passed.

During December 1967 and early January 1968, about 10,000 Greek troops were withdrawn.¹³³ Makarios did not disband the National Guard, however, something he came to regret when it rebelled against him in 1974.

Seizing the opportune moment after the crisis had ended, in late December 1967 Turkish Cypriot leaders announced the establishment of a "transitional administration" to govern their community's affairs "until such time as the provisions of the Constitution of 1960 have been fully implemented." The "Autonomous Provisional Cyprus Turkish Administration" was approved on 28 December 1967, and a "Basic Law" was passed as a substitute for a constitution.¹³⁴ The body's President was Fazil Kutchuk, Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, and its Vice-President was Rauf Denktas, President of the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber. Based on the new arrangements, the Turkish Cypriots had created all the necessary institutions and organized to function as an independent "state" within Cyprus.

¹³² Robert McDonald, "The Problem of Cyprus," *Adelphi Papers* 234 (winter 1988/9): 15.

¹³³ James A. Bill, *George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Michigan: Book Crafters, Inc., 1997), 187.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

The provisional administration did not state that the Communal Chamber was being abolished. Nor did it seek recognition as a government. Such actions would have been contrary to the provisions of the constitution and the Zurich-London agreements, and the Turkish Cypriots as well as the Turks scrupulously avoided any such abrogation.

The Greek Cypriots immediately concluded that the formation of such governing bodies was in preparation for partition. U Thant was also critical of the new organizations. President Makarios, seeking a fresh mandate from his constituency, announced in January 1968 that elections would be held during February. Küçük, determined to adhere to the constitution, then announced that elections for vice president would also be held. Elections were subsequently held in the Turkish Cypriot community, which the Greek Cypriot government considered invalid; Kutchuk was returned to office unopposed. Two weeks later, Makarios received 220,911 votes (about 96 percent), and his opponent, Takis Evdokas, running on a straight *enosis* platform, received 8,577 votes.¹³⁵ Even though there were 16,215 abstentions,¹³⁶ Makarios's overwhelming victory was seen as a massive endorsement of his personal leadership and of an independent Cyprus. At his inauguration, the President stated that the Cyprus problem could not be solved by force, but had to be worked out within the framework of the UN.

In mid-1968 intercommunal talks under UN auspices began in Beirut. Glafkos Clerides, President of the House of Representatives, and Rauf Denktas were involved in the first stages of these talks, which lasted until 1974. Although many points of agreement were arrived at, no lasting agreements were reached. Turkish Cypriot

¹³⁵ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 24, no. 1248 (March 7-13, 1968): 95.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

proposals emphasized the importance of the local government of each ethnic community at the expense of the central government, whereas the Greek Cypriot negotiating teams stressed the dominance of the central authorities over local administration.

In the early 1970s, Cyprus was in fact a partitioned country. Makarios was the President of the republic, but his authority did not extend into the Turkish enclaves. The House of Representatives sat as the legislature, but only the thirty-five Greek Cypriot seats were functioning as part of a central government. The partition sought for years by Turks and Turkish Cypriots existed *de facto*, but intercommunal strife had not ended. In the summer of 1971, tension arose again between the two communities, and incidents became more numerous.

In February 1972, a new crisis rekindled intercommunal tensions when Makarios government had received a shipment of Czechoslovakian arms.¹³⁷ The guns were intended for Makarios's own elite guard. The Greek government, hoping to overthrow Makarios through Grivas, EOKA B, and the National Guard, objected to the import of the arms. The authorities in Ankara were more than willing to join Athens in such a protest, and both governments demanded that the Czechoslovakian munitions be turned over to UNFICYP. Makarios was eventually forced to comply.¹³⁸

Relations between Nicosia and Athens were at such a low that the colonels of the Greek junta, recognizing that they had Makarios in a perilous position, issued an ultimatum for him to reform his government and rid it of ministers who had been critical of the junta. The colonels, however, had not reckoned with the phenomenal popularity of

¹³⁷ Kyriacos C. Markides, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic* (South Braintree, Mass.: The Alpine Press, 1977), 137.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

the archbishop, and once again mass demonstrations proved that Makarios had the people behind him. In the end, however, Makarios bowed to Greek pressure and reshuffled the cabinet. Working against Makarios was the fact that most officers of the Cypriot National Guard were Greek regulars who supported the junta and its desire to remove him from office and achieve some degree of *enosis*. Grivas was also a threat to the archbishop. He remained powerful and to some extent was independent of the junta that had permitted his return to Cyprus.

Grivas and his one-track pursuit of *enosis* through active resistance had become an embarrassment to the Greek Cypriot government, as well as to the Greek government that had sponsored his return to the island. His fame and popularity in both countries, however, prevented his removal. That problem was solved on 27 January 1974, when the general died of a heart attack. Makarios granted his followers an amnesty, hoping that EOKA B would disappear after the death of its leader. EOKA's armed struggle continued, however, and the 70,000 mourners¹³⁹ who attended Grivas' funeral reflected the enduring popularity of his political aims.

C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE DISPUTE

The United States foreign policy during the 1964 - 1974 period applied in a way that had served the American national interests best. Military confrontation between Greece and Turkey was averted once again in 1967. However, in its efforts to achieve

¹³⁹ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 34, no. 1734 (February 2, 1974): 73.

this end, the United States had to put aside other crucial elements in its bilateral relations with the countries directly involved with the Cyprus dispute.

The Acheson Plan demonstrated a major U.S. foreign policy shift in 1964. The U.S. posture towards the dispute up to then could be judged rather pro-Greek overall. It had obviously deterred Turkey from militarily intervening in Cypriot domestic affairs. The plan that Mr. Acheson had proposed during the Geneva negotiations of 1964, which was of course backed by the United States Administration, suggested a *de jure* partition of Cyprus. This proposed plan would essentially have realized the Turkish expectations. The cantonization and militarization of Cyprus would not have presented a viable and definite solution at all to the Cyprus problem. Therefore, the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots would be rather distrustful of the U.S. intentions at a fair solution to the dispute.

Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that the U.S. diplomatic intervention of Cyprus Vance of 1967 was, as in 1964, decisive in averting a military confrontation between Greece and Turkey. In other words, it again established a kind of stability, at least a state of non-hostility between the parties involved. However, the improvement in relations between Greece and the United States that would have been expected following such successful U.S. diplomacy concerning the issue was overshadowed by another political development. Throughout the decade between 1964-1974, the U.S. maintained good bilateral relations with the Greek Colonels' regime, even though the junta regime was repressive, and, thus, unpopular within Greece (not to mention other European countries). Consequently, the Greek people became suspicious of the U.S. entanglement in their affairs. Moreover, as soon as the junta regime fell and democracy was restored in Greece, anti-American sentiments would continue naturally in Greek political affairs.

On the other side of the Aegean, Turkey began 1974 with another disappointment as far as its relations with the U.S. were concerned. In the period from 1964 to 1967, Americans had seemed remorseful of President Johnson's letter of 1964, and tried to appease Turkey and improve relations.

However, in 1967 developments in Cyprus led to a peak in intercommunal violence. This would have been a good reason for the Turks to set in motion their plans for invading Cyprus. Moreover, the exercising its right to impose the Cypriot Constitution of 1960 would make the entire Turkish military action legitimate. Nonetheless, the United States once more set them back. It was the second time since 1964 that the Turkish plans for Cyprus were aborted. Both times, it was the United States that changed the Turkish plans. Thus, U.S. interventionism was becoming perceived by Turkey in a negative light. Consequently, if the Turks were presented again with the opportunity to act militarily in Cyprus in the future, it would become even more arduous for the Americans to apply decisive conflict-resolving diplomacy.

Finally, for the Cypriot government, the foreign policy that the United States had performed throughout the 1964-1974 decade was rather alienating. Makarios and the Greek Cypriots were clearly seeking a *status quo* on the island that would establish them in power, leaving them in substantial control of both communities. Up until 1974, the only "successful" proposition for a solution to the Cyprus problem that was set on the negotiating table was the one proposed by Dean Acheson in 1964. However, the Acheson Plan did not blend well with Makarios' power-sharing plans. Therefore, sympathy for the Greek Cypriots' solution would be sought elsewhere. Since Greece would certainly oppose Cypriot rapprochement with the Soviets, the only acceptable

institution through whom Makarios might achieve such an end would be the United Nations.

V. THE SECOND CRISIS – THE TURKISH INVASION OF JULY 1974

The second crisis in the Cyprus problem culminated in an extraordinary event: the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. The Turks could no longer accept the virtual prohibition of military intervention in Cyprus that had resulted from President Johnson's letter to the Turkish Prime Minister İnönü in 1964.

This crisis was significant once it altered the nature of the dispute over Cyprus between Greece and the Greek Cypriots on one side, and Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots on the other. Whereas the international efforts for resolution before 1974 focused on the solution to a domestic dispute within Cyprus, after 1974, the dispute turned into a broader international problem. This alternation threatened not only the very existence of the Republic of Cyprus, but also, due to a potential military confrontation of the two motherlands (Greece and Turkey), the east Mediterranean and the wider Balkan region. Accordingly, it became an additional high-priority issue in the already long history of Cold War disputes between East and West.

In the period before the 1974 crisis in Greece, a highly repressive military junta had ruled since November 1973 under the leadership of Colonel Dimitrios Ioannides. This junta had overthrown another junta under Colonel George Papadopoulos, which had seized power in April 1967. During this seven-year period, the two successive junta governments had boosted radical nationalism in Greece, which did not leave Cyprus unaffected. The extension of nationalistic ideals reached Cyprus from the early years of the Greek junta's power. Both junta governments had bolstered the reactionism of EOKA. In addition, the Cypriot National Guard was staffed by Greek army officers. The

latter, acting under the orders of their national authorities (the Greek junta officers), were constantly trying to overthrow Makarios' government.

During the same period in Turkey, a weak coalition government had been formed on 13 January 1974.¹⁴⁰ The coalition consisted of the Republican People's Party (RPP), under Bulent Ecevit, and the National Salvation Party (NSP), under Necmettin Erbakan. The country up to 1974 had been through one military coup in 1960 and survived a near military coup in 1971; nevertheless, the military substantially controlled the country's political life. Except for the economic recession and the rise of Islam, Turkey was also occupied with nationalism. This latter movement put pressure on the regime to use its right of unilateral intervention by taking military action in Cyprus to restore the agreed-upon terms of the London – Zurich Accords. The extension of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus was represented by TMT, a Turkish-Cypriot paramilitary organization much like EOKA on the Greek-Cypriot side.

When analyzing United States foreign policy during the period when the 1974 Cyprus crisis occurred, one should take into account the context within which it occurred. First, the United States was preoccupied with the Watergate scandal (1972-1974) that finally toppled President Nixon in August 1974. Second, a Cold War perspective dominated this period. Cold War strategic doctrines provided the guidelines for both the U.S. and Soviet policies towards the Cyprus dispute. The primary U.S. goal was the "NATOization" of Cyprus the way it was conceived in the Acheson plan of 1964 (double

¹⁴⁰ FBIS, 26 January 1974.

enosis, or union). The Soviet goal was that Cyprus remain non-aligned, but pro-Soviet.¹⁴¹

Nevertheless, American foreign policy was inconsistent and contradictory during the evolution of the crisis. From the beginning of the Cyprus dispute up to June 1964, the U.S. foreign policy followed a rather pro-Greek bent. However, during the period of 1964-1974, it maintained a policy of evenhandedness (if not pro-Turkish, following the Acheson Plan's virtual substantiation of the Turkish expectations for the division of Cyprus).

Another significant factor that contributed greatly to the formulation of the United States foreign policy was admittedly the Greek-American community living within the United States. There were Greek efforts to influence the U.S. foreign policy decisions through the politically powerful Greek-American lobby. The ethnically motivated mobilization of the Greek-American community within the United States played a significant role in favor of the Greek and Greek-Cypriot causes during the dispute.¹⁴² Intensive Greek-American lobbying later contributed a great deal to the imposition of the 1975 arms embargo on Turkey.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics-From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 72.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ David E. Long, and Bernard Reich, *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa* 3rd (Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), 33.

A. THE EVENTS

In 1974, Cypriot independence was shattered as Turkey invaded the island republic. The Turkish invasion was precipitated by a military coup against the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios.

The years 1970 to 1973 saw increasing political divisions and violence within the Greek Cypriot community, which had been divided into pro-Makarios and anti-Makarios factions. In this regard, the Greek military junta, which came to power in Athens in 1967, played a highly divisive and destabilizing role in Cyprus. The Greek General Grivas had returned to Cyprus in 1971 and revitalized EOKA, establishing another paramilitary organization under the acronym "EOKA B." However, Grivas died on 27 January 1974 in Limassol.

The previously mentioned internal divisions culminated in a military coup against Makarios staged on 15 July 1974. The coup was engineered by the Greek junta and carried out on its orders by the Cypriot National Guard under the command of Greek officers. Makarios knew about the Greek junta's intentions, and accordingly, he had sent a letter to the Greek president General Phaedon Gizikis on 2 July 1974. In his letter, Makarios expressed his objections to the coup plotted against his government, and asked for the withdrawal of the 650 Greek officers that served in the Cypriot National Guard. However, the coup did occur. On 19 July 1974, Makarios appeared before the UN Security Council in New York and appealed for the restoration of his government.

Moreover, new problems and adventures for the already forlorn island republic were still to come. On 20 July 1974, five days after the coup against the Cypriot

President, Turkey invaded Cyprus. It claimed that the invasion, which was precipitated by the Greek-engineered coup, was a "peace operation"¹⁴⁴ aimed at the restoration of constitutional order in the republic and at protecting the Turkish Cypriot minority.

Greece responded immediately to the invasion. Greece believed that it was not only Cyprus, but also the whole Greek nation being threatened.¹⁴⁵ Thus, Greece declared a general mobilization and prepared for war with Turkey.¹⁴⁶ Following the evolution of the events and fearing expansion of the fighting in the eastern Mediterranean region, Syria placed its armed forces on maximum alert, and Egypt restricted its navy to home waters.¹⁴⁷

However, war between the two countries was averted, and constitutional order was partially restored in Cyprus on 24 July, when the Speaker of the House, Glafkos Clerides, became Acting President of the Republic, as stipulated by the 1960 Constitution. Constitutional order eventually was fully restored when Makarios returned to Cyprus and resumed his post as President in December 1974.

On 14 August 1974, the Turkish military launched the second round of its invasion of the island. By the end of this round (on August 16), Turkish forces had reached what they called the "Attila Line," capturing the northern 37 percent of the island's territory and forcibly expelling the local Greek population from their homes.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ FBIS, 27 July 1974.

¹⁴⁵ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Cyprus - 1974: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe*, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 19 and 20 August 1974, 29.

¹⁴⁶ FBIS, 27 July 1974.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Clive Schofield, and Peter Hocknell, *Instability in the Eastern Mediterranean: A Cypriot Crisis in the Making*, Jane's Intelligence Report, ed. Alison Clayton, and Peter Felstead, Special Report no. 17 (Thomson Heath, UK: Jane's Information Group Ltd, 1998), 14.

After the Turkish invasion, about 200,000 Greek Cypriots became refugees¹⁴⁹ and were forced to move to the south. At the same time, 40,000 Turkish Cypriots were transferred from the government-controlled southern part of Cyprus to the Turkish-occupied north.¹⁵⁰ Thus, Cyprus was *de facto* partitioned by force of arms.

B. EFFORTS FOR RESOLUTION – THE U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE PROBLEM

The United States knew that after the coup against Makarios there was a real danger of Turkish military intervention in Cyprus.¹⁵¹ Accordingly, President Nixon sent the U.S. Undersecretary of State, Joseph J. Sisco, to London after the British invited Ecevit to London for talks on 17 July 1974, just after the coup in Cyprus. Sisco was assigned the duty, in cooperation with the British, to try to avert a potential military confrontation between Greece and Turkey¹⁵² that might follow with a Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. This effort, while it was successful in averting a war between Greece and Turkey, evidently proved unsuccessful in changing the Turkish decision to intervene. Nonetheless, the United States surprisingly took a very relaxed attitude when

¹⁴⁹ Cyprus Government Public Information Office, *The Cyprus Problem: Historical Review and Analysis of Latest Developments* (Nicosia: Printing Office of the Republic of Cyprus, 1975), 10.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Cyprus – 1974: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe*, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 19 and 20 August 1974, 9.

¹⁵² FBIS, 20 July 1974.

Makarios was ousted, knowing that such reluctance might bring about a military intervention by Turkey in Cyprus.¹⁵³

The Soviets approached Turkey diplomatically. The Soviet ambassador to Turkey, Vasily F. Grubyakov, held a meeting with Turkish President Fahri Koruturk in Ankara on 16 July. Grubyakov had assured the Turkish President of the Soviet Union's support in defending the integrity and independence of Cyprus. On the same day, the Soviet *chargé d'affaires* in Athens had delivered a strong note, warning that Greece would have to bear full responsibility for the consequences of the coup against Makarios. The Soviet Union delivered a statement on 17 July, charging NATO with responsibility for the Cypriot coup.¹⁵⁴

The United States shifted the U.S. position on the Cyprus issue. On 20 July 1974, U.S. State Department spokesman Robert Anderson issued the following statement on the problem: "We [the U.S.] regret this military action by Turkey [sic] just as we deplore the previous action by Greece that precipitated the crisis."¹⁵⁵ While the United States had up to then applied an "evenhanded" policy, it was now charging Greece (which was on the defensive in this case) with behind-the-scenes intervention in Cypriot domestic politics. Accordingly, the U.S. temporarily suspended military aid to Greece, while there was no indication of a proportionate U.S. measure against Turkey.¹⁵⁶

Following the Turkish invasion of 20 July 1974, the United States and Britain initiated intensive negotiations between Greece and Turkey that concluded with a UN-

¹⁵³ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Cyprus - 1974: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe*, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 19 and 20 August 1974, 15.

¹⁵⁴ FBIS, 20 July 1974.

¹⁵⁵ FBIS, 27 July 1974.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

sponsored cease-fire agreement on 22 July. The U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, led the negotiations by conducting "telephone diplomacy,"¹⁵⁷ assisted by Undersecretary Sisco, who conducted shuttle diplomacy between Athens and Ankara from 19 to 22 July.

Following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the Greek junta's indifference to it, the Ioannides' regime collapsed under the pressure of its actions, or inaction. Accordingly in Greece, there was a significant political development: the restoration of democracy. On 23 July 1974, the last democratically elected Prime Minister before the 1967 military coup, namely Constantine Caramanlis, was recalled from his Paris exile¹⁵⁸ and formed a transitional government that would last up to the next parliamentary elections.

The intensive Anglo-American efforts continued and combined with those of the United Nations. The international efforts to bring the two sides to the negotiating table advanced, and a conference took place in Geneva in search of a solution to the Cyprus situation. The guarantors of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee (Great Britain, Greece and Turkey) participated in the meeting that lasted from 24 to 30 July.

The results were not promising at all. Great Britain, Greece and Turkey signed a cease-fire agreement to halt the fighting that had continued on Cyprus after the agreement of 22 July 1974. However, there was no settlement of the Cyprus problem itself. Accordingly, all the interested parties agreed to hold a second round of talks about one week later.

¹⁵⁷ FBIS, 27 July 1974.

¹⁵⁸ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 223.

Nevertheless, in the absence of effective UN supervision of troop positions, Turkey continued to violate the cease-fire agreement on Cyprus.¹⁵⁹ From 8 to 14 August, the second round of the Geneva talks took place with the same participants as in the first round. Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, was also assigned as an observer, but he was not present in the conference.¹⁶⁰ During the meetings, both Greeks and Turks held to very hard and inflexible positions. Additionally, both sides were aware that the United States had the capability to apply effective influence, and they expected America to use this capability.

On the American side, a major change in the administration occurred: following President Nixon's resignation after the Watergate scandal on 8 August 1974, Gerald R. Ford took the oath as the thirty-eighth President the next day. The new American President was inexperienced in international affairs, and as such, he retained at the position of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, also declaring that the current U.S. foreign policy would be preserved.¹⁶¹

On 13 August 1974, the State Department, having acquired information about a new Turkish military advance, issued a statement declaring the U.S. position on Cyprus. According to this statement, the United States would consider any resort to military action on Cyprus unjustified.¹⁶² Turkey felt that the declaration had constituted an

¹⁵⁹ FBIS, 3 August 1974.

¹⁶⁰ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Cyprus - 1974: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe*, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 19 and 20 August 1974, 17.

¹⁶¹ FBIS, 10 August 1974.

¹⁶² U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Cyprus - 1974: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe*, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 19 and 20 August 1974, 23.

American undermining of the Turkish position overall.¹⁶³ However, the United States had no plans for action,¹⁶⁴ and it maintained an "even-handed" policy during this period.

During the so-called Geneva II conference, Turkey pressed for a federal solution to the problem against stiffening Greek resistance. However, whereas Turkish Cypriots wanted a bi-zonal federation, Turkey submitted a cantonal plan involving the separation of Turkish-Cypriot areas from one another. For security reasons Turkish-Cypriots did not favor cantons. Each plan embraced about 34 percent of the territory.¹⁶⁵ British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan asked for 36 hours from the Turkish side for consultation, which was also the Greek request, in order to study the Turkish propositions for a resolution of the problem.¹⁶⁶ However, the Greek wish was not granted by the Turks. Actually, the British Foreign Secretary felt that the Turkish government had already ordered the new attack against Greek-Cypriots in Cyprus before the conclusion of the Geneva talks.¹⁶⁷ The outcome of the Geneva negotiations was a deadlock, and the ensuing second major attack of the Turkish forces on Cyprus began.

Following and just after the second round of the Turkish invasion, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 357, in which it demanded "that all parties to the present fighting cease all firing and military action forthwith." From the American side, President Ford issued a statement on 15 August 1974, calling attention to a statement

¹⁶³ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Cyprus – 1974: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe*, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 19 and 20 August 1974, 24.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁶⁵ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 34, no. 1762 (August 17, 1974): 662.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Cyprus – 1974: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe*, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 19 and 20 August 1974, 17.

released by the State Department the previous day. This latter statement disapproved of the Turkish military action on Cyprus and urged immediate compliance with the relevant United Nations' cease-fire resolution.¹⁶⁸

From another point of view, there was much controversy associated with the United States foreign policy at the time. It seemed that a wait-and-see policy had been adopted by the U.S. concerning the Cyprus issue. This was clearly expressed in the statements that U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made at a press conference while the second round of the Turkish invasion was in progress.¹⁶⁹ During the conference, Kissinger defined the U.S. goals as follows:¹⁷⁰

- a. To prevent a war between Greece and Turkey.
- b. To maintain the possibility of a settlement of the Cyprus issue according to constitutional legitimacy.
- c. To prevent further internationalization of the conflict.

Judging from the outcome, which was the actual American response to the problem at hand, one might conclude that Kissinger's goals were closer to U.S. foreign policy than those of President Ford. The American efforts were mainly focused on trying to bring both sides of the dispute to the negotiating table. This objective became impossible for the American negotiators in light of the Turkish actions.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁸ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Cyprus – 1974: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe*, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 19 and 20 August 1974, 24.

¹⁶⁹ Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics-From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 74.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Cyprus – 1974: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe*, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 19 and 20 August 1974, 25.

C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

Following the rationale of the Cold War period, an important matter came into play, along with the Cyprus problem, that preoccupied the United States political establishment at the time: the issue of NATO coherence. The reasons were several. First, Turkey and Greece were both NATO and U.S. allies, and were on the verge of war. Such a development would obviously destabilize the entire Eastern Mediterranean region, which formed the Southeast flank of NATO. Second, Greece disengaged its military from NATO's integrated commands, effective 14 August 1974,¹⁷² as a consequence of NATO's support for the undemocratic regime.¹⁷³ Third, the political turnover in Greece generated Greek reactions, changing the way the U.S. was viewed in Greece. The military junta regime had stepped back, and the Karamanlis government was confronted with strong anti-American feelings among the Greek people. The Greeks resented the United States because of their support for the Colonels' regime.¹⁷⁴ Fourth, Athens had terminated the recently acquired home-porting rights of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.¹⁷⁵ Thus, it would be difficult for NATO to monitor the West side of the Aegean Sea, the checkpoint for the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Fifth, any American intervention that might favor Greek

¹⁷² Nikos Kouris, *Greece - Turkey: The Fifty-Year "War"* (Athens: Livanis Publishing Organization, 1997), 166-167.

¹⁷³ Robert McDonald, "The Problem of Cyprus," *Adelphi Papers* 234 (winter 1988/9): 19.

¹⁷⁴ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Cyprus - 1974: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe*, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 19 and 20 August 1974, 50-51.

¹⁷⁵ Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson, and Raimondo L. Wilmington, *NATO and the Mediterranean* (SR Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985), 203.

interests would move Turkey closer to the Soviet Union, with unpredictable consequences.

The aforementioned United States policy of "evenhandedness" resulted in a deterioration of U.S. relations with the Greek government, and an increase in anti-American feelings, which had been expressed through massive demonstrations all over Greece.¹⁷⁶ Moreover, Greece held the United States directly responsible for the events on Cyprus "both for sins of commission and omission."¹⁷⁷ The Greek people were greatly disappointed with America's favorable posture toward the former, repressive military junta. Thus, as the former Undersecretary of State during the Johnson administration, George Ball, pointed out, the Greek people expected a public signal of support for their cause from the U.S. administration.¹⁷⁸ However, no such signal came. Accordingly, their disappointment turned to indignation against the United States.

Indicative of the Greek indignation were not only the front pages of many newspapers, but also the statements made by several Greek politicians just after the restoration of civilian rule and the lifting of censorship on 27 July 1974. They both demanded the removal of the U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Henry J. Taska, charging him with having been a supporter of the military junta.¹⁷⁹ Ambassador Taska, who had been in this post since 1970, had been attacked during the first half of 1974 for his support for

¹⁷⁶ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Cyprus - 1974: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe*, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 19 and 20 August 1974, 14.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 40.

¹⁷⁹ FBIS, 17 August 1974.

the junta. Finally, in August 1974, Mr. Taska was replaced by Jack B. Kubisch, former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American affairs.¹⁸⁰

Nevertheless, the Greeks were not the only ones that were alienated by the United States role in the Cyprus crisis of 1974. The Greek-Cypriots were also alienated and angered as well. The Greek Cypriot feelings against the United States were clearly depicted in an anti-American demonstration by Greek Cypriots that took place in Nicosia on 19 August 1974. It concluded with an attack against the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia and the killing of the U.S. ambassador to Cyprus, Rodger P. Davies, and of an embassy secretary who had rushed to the ambassador's aid.¹⁸¹

Finally, considering the Greek-American reactions, on 18 August 1974 there was a demonstration of almost 20,000 Americans of Greek descent before the White House.¹⁸² The demonstrators protested against the U.S. policy in the present Cyprus crisis, and asked for the resignation of Secretary of State Kissinger.¹⁸³

The United States, keeping in mind the Turkish position that there would not be another situation like the one in 1964,¹⁸⁴ did not wish to assume the role of the unilateral enforcer of the UN resolutions. However, as the leading nation of the Western powers, the United States wished to prove its leadership by being actively involved in the negotiations of the issue.

¹⁸⁰ "Cyprus," *Facts on File* 34, no. 1762 (August 17, 1974): 675.

¹⁸¹ FBIS, 24 August 1974.

¹⁸² FBIS, 24 August 1974.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Cyprus - 1974: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe*, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 19 and 20 August 1974, 4.

The day following the second major Turkish attack on Cyprus, resentment on the Greek side became obvious. The Greek Prime Minister, Constantine Caramanlis, announced that Greece would not go to war with Turkey. However, he also criticized the United States for its favorable posture toward Turkey. Caramanlis stated that the latter had "engaged in these infamous acts [the new Turkish advance in Cyprus and the diplomatic intransigence] with the toleration of those who should and could have checked her."¹⁸⁵

The invasion and ongoing occupation have also resulted in radical changes in the ethnodemography of Cyprus as tens of thousands of Turkish mainland settlers have been colonizing occupied Cyprus. People in the occupied territory, on the other hand, have been subjected to a highly militarized and tightly controlled society since 1974, a society that increasingly resembles Turkey's cultural and political landscape.

The Turkish invasion of 1974 represented a watershed in Cypriot history and had a profound effect on the small island republic. The Turkish army effected the *de facto* partition of the island along the Attila Line. In social, economic and cultural terms, there is a clear dichotomy along the territorial division of the Attila line.

Since the 1974 Turkish invasion, the free southern part of the island republic has become a prosperous place, enjoying the highest per capita income (\$20,500 in 1997¹⁸⁶) in the eastern Mediterranean region. The impressive economic growth, the rapid urbanization, the high standards of literacy, and the massive influx of tourists have affected Cypriot culture in a variety of ways.

¹⁸⁵ FBIS, 17 August 1974.

¹⁸⁶ FBIS, 26 May 1998.

The northern part of Cyprus at the same time, has experienced major economic difficulties, since it cannot efficiently interact economically by itself, since it has no legitimate authority. Accordingly, the per capita income of the northern Cypriots is quite lower than that of the southerners (\$4,234 in 1997¹⁸⁷). There is no freedom of movement on the island, which is populated by Turkish Cypriots in the North, and Greek Cypriots in the South. Finally, the Muslim Turkish Cypriots dwell in the North, while the Christian Greek Cypriots live in the South.

Furthermore, after the Turkish invasion of 1974, the stances of the two Cypriot communities were radicalized towards more uncompromising postures. With 40,000 Turkish troops comprising the occupation force on Cyprus,¹⁸⁸ it would be naïve for anyone to believe that the two communities coexisting on the island would sit at the same table to negotiate a settlement of their intercommunal problems.

Finally, there were developments in the relations between Turkey and the United States. There had been an open issue between the two countries since the 1960s: the poppy cultivation issue. Turkey was one of the major producers of poppy, and as such, it became the major country of origin for narcotics exported to the United States. The U.S. responded by forcing Turkey to prohibit the export of poppy to America, which was a blow to the economy of Turkey. In spite of concessions made by both sides, the issue remained unsettled.

The second issue concerning the relations between the two countries emerged after the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The Turkish Prime Minister initially praised

¹⁸⁷ FBIS, 18 November 1997.

¹⁸⁸ Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson, and Raimondo L. Wilmington, *NATO and the Mediterranean* (SR Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985), 196.

the "fairness" of the American foreign policy on the Cyprus issue, simultaneously expressing Turkey's umbrage against Britain. On 13 August 1974, British Foreign Secretary Callaghan denounced Turkey for breaking off the Geneva talks.¹⁸⁹

However, the arms embargo that was imposed on Turkey by the United States on 5 February 1975 was a direct consequence of the Turkish violation of the terms of the Foreign Assistance Act. The reason was that equipment (part of the American military aid to Turkey that was delivered for defensive purposes in the context of NATO's common defense against the Soviets) had been used on Cyprus for offensive purposes by Turkey.¹⁹⁰

The U.S. arms embargo had several impacts in Turkey. Turkey was one of the major recipients U.S. military aid and depended on it greatly. Accordingly, the Turkish armed forces suffered from a lack of military equipment. However, the most significant damage was psychological: the embargo reinforced Ankara's suspicions that in case of Soviet aggression, the United States might leave Turkey to defend its territorial integrity and national sovereignty alone.¹⁹¹ Accordingly, Turkey was alienated from the United States politically, and turned towards the surrounding Middle Eastern countries for support of its causes.

Turkey's reaction to the U.S.-imposed arms embargo came almost five months later. On 26 July 1975, Turkey suspended U.S. operations at all military installations

¹⁸⁹ FBIS, 17 August 1974.

¹⁹⁰ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Cyprus - 1974: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe*, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 19 and 20 August 1974, 18-19.

¹⁹¹ Ali Karaosinoglu, "Turkey and the Southern Flank: Domestic and External Contexts," in *NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges*, ed. John Chipman (New York: Routledge, 1988), 319.

within Turkey.¹⁹² Following these developments, one might argue that the U.S. arms embargo against Turkey not only failed to promote a Cyprus settlement, but also weakened the Southern Flank of NATO. Eventually, the U.S. arms embargo was lifted three years later in 1978.¹⁹³

D. CONCLUSIONS

During the evolution of the Cyprus crisis in 1974 there were many international efforts made towards its resolution. However, the United States played a crucial role in the development of the situation. Nevertheless, while it was quite influential with the parties that were engaged in the problem, the U.S. was also ignorant.

Moreover, the U.S. interests in the eastern Mediterranean were not invested in Cyprus, but rather in the Southern Flank of NATO. The United States government executives, having been constantly preoccupied with Cold War arrangements and the corresponding *Realpolitik*, actually had ignored the whole Cyprus situation.

There were several implications of the United States foreign policy in the period under examination:

- a. Turkey invaded Cyprus, thus imposing a *de facto* partition of the island, and an inevitable stalemate of the procedure for resolution of the problem.

¹⁹² Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson, and Raimondo L. Wilmington, *NATO and the Mediterranean* (SR Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985), 220.

¹⁹³ Graham E. Fuller, and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), 122.

- b. Two hundred thousand Greek-Cypriot refugees were expelled from their homes, a problem that remains unsolved today.
- c. Anti-American feelings emerged in Greek public opinion, as well as a kind of chagrin among the Greek-American lobby, which was not a negligible factor in U.S. politics.
- d. Turkey has been uncompromising and reluctant to accept any political solution that would restore the pre-invasion status of Cyprus.
- e. The two Cypriot communities co-existing on the island were alienated from each other, and accordingly, the possibility of their rapprochement and a resolution of their disputes still seems distant.
- f. In view of the fact that the U.S. military aid provided to Turkey was being used for purposes other than the agreed-upon needs of the common defense in the context of the Cold War, the United States felt compelled to stop delivering such aid to Turkey. This last U.S. action, combined with the declared U.S. willingness to maintain friendly relations with both Greece and Turkey, alienated the Turks and further decreased the U.S. influence on Turkey.

The U.S. indifference towards Turkey's imposition of a situation by force made the Greek government suspicious of the good will of the U.S. mediation efforts. Therefore, it would take a long time to restore even the limited mutual trust between the two countries that had admittedly existed before the Turkish invasion.

VI. CONCLUSIONS - THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE CYPRUS PROBLEM (1959 - 1974)

Throughout most of its existence, Cyprus had been a quiet island of the east Mediterranean Basin. However, after the Ottoman conquest of 1571, the island was colonized by Turkish contingents and was administered by the Ottomans in the context of the *millet* system. The Ottomans ceded authority over Cyprus to Britain in the late-1870s. However, since there was no transfer of population, the structure of the population remained much the same as before. Greeks and Turks peacefully coexisted on the island. This tranquillity lasted until the late 1950s, when the island was granted its independence by the British and questions of power arose.

During the immediate post-independence period, demographics favored the Greeks, the more traditional inhabitants of the island. Nonetheless, up to 1960, a balance of power was maintained between the two communities, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Indeed, there had been calm on the island, as long as the colonial powers, (the Ottoman Empire and later, Britain) bore the burden of administration of Cypriot affairs.

However, the founding Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 essentially disregarded the major political realities of the island. Greek Cypriots were the majority that had originally established Cyprus and had been living there for centuries before the Turkish Cypriot minority settled on the island. Moreover, only the Greek Cypriots had fought for independence from Britain and shed their blood for this cause, while the Turkish Cypriots simply enjoyed the fruits of the Greek Cypriot armed struggle.

However, during the London-Zurich negotiations, Greek Cypriots asked not only for independence, but also, in order to feel secure from Turkey, for *enosis* (union) with Greece. Therefore, it was foreseeable that the power imbalances that the 1960 Cypriot Constitution had created would eventually cause social upheaval and troubles in the new Cypriot republic. Consequently, in the years that immediately followed the establishment of the independent Republic of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots, led by Archbishop Makarios, asked for what was rightfully theirs: fair representation in the public activities of the island.

However, the Turkish Cypriot side opposed the proposed constitutional changes. More significantly, Turkey (not the Turkish Cypriots) was decrying any constitutional rearrangement. It was Turkey, after all, which had demanded such arrangements during the negotiations of Zurich and London in 1959.

Consequently, violence erupted on Cyprus in late 1963, and Turkey became actively involved with Cypriot affairs from the very beginning of the intercommunal problems. Therefore, it would be natural that Greece would support the Greek Cypriots in their quest for either *enosis*, or at least independence.

After the late-1950s, the British had relinquished power over Cypriot affairs to the U.S., which was also the leading nation and the trustee of the western power structure. Therefore, the United States was diplomatically involved with the Cyprus dispute. However, the U.S. entanglement with the Cyprus issue would be confined to a balancing rather than a solution-establishing role.

The early events of 1963 evolved in a way that would inevitably bring the two mainlands, namely Greece and Turkey, to the brink of war. That is where the United

States came into action. It was in the vital interests of the U.S. that the east Mediterranean remain stable. Two of its NATO allies were disputing an issue that was affecting U.S. national interests. A potential outbreak of hostility between Greece and Turkey would destabilize east Mediterranean and would inevitably affect the cohesion of the North Atlantic Alliance. At the time, a vacuum in NATO's southeastern flank would be disastrous in the midst of the Cold War; thus, hostility would be the last thing the United States might have wished.

The Turks invaded Cyprus in 1974 with the alleged aim to fulfill Turkey's respective right to re-establish the *status quo* as provided by the Zurich-London Accords. Nonetheless, not only did Turkey neglect to restore the previous constitutional situation of Cyprus, it also created and internationalized the Cyprus problem. Even if somebody accepted that the invasion of 20 July 1974 was aimed at the restoration of the Cypriot constitution, it would be impossible to consider legitimate the second round of invasions in August of the same year. The facts were astonishing: Turkey occupied almost forty percent of the Cypriot territory; the two co-existing communities on the island were separated by the U.N.-drawn *Green Line*; and each community was enclaved to the North and South respectively. However, there was no way to establish communication between them to resolve their common problems. Therefore, there would be no foreseeable solution to the Cyprus problem, at least in the near future. Furthermore, since Turkey, by invading Cyprus, was directly involved, and Greece was positioned on the other side, a potential solution would be difficult to be agreed upon.

The so-called U.S. foreign policy of "evenhandedness" that had applied during the period under consideration experienced various setbacks, depending on the angle from

which the implications are considered. The United States foreign policy affected all the actors directly involved with the dispute. Specifically, the United States foreign policy towards the Cyprus problem affected the following:

- a. The United States itself.
- b. Great Britain.
- c. Greece and Turkey.
- d. The Republic of Cyprus.
- e. The United Nations.

From the American point of view, the U.S. foreign policy towards the Cyprus issue was admittedly consistent. The main goal of the American foreign policy was to make sure that the East Mediterranean region would remain stable. A war between two NATO allies, namely Greece and Turkey, would be out of the question, especially during the Cold War. War between Greece and Turkey did not occur, and therefore, the U.S. foreign policy goal was achieved.

Furthermore, a secondary foreign policy goal for the United States was to maintain its presence in the East Mediterranean and Middle East regions. Cyprus was not of great significance for the U.S. as a country, but it wanted to make sure that it would at least remain under western influence (such as under NATO). Arguably, this end was partially achieved by the United States. The manipulation of the dispute by the U.S. with Greece and Turkey, respectively, permitted the U.S. to maintain its presence in the east Mediterranean region. However, U.S. presence in the area would be only remote. U.S. Forces could still (and actually did in several cases) use the British military facilities of Cyprus, should they be needed. The status of the two British military bases and part of

the international airport of Larnaca on Cyprus permitted for such activities, since they constituted sovereign British territory.

For the British, the U.S. involvement with the Cyprus issue might be interpreted as an acceptable turnover of western power politics. Britain had judged the Cyprus imbroglio too heavy to bear, but it still needed a presence in the area. The U.S foreign policy permitted the British to disengage from a "hot point" of their former sphere of influence. Therefore, if Britain could preserve its two military facilities on Cyprus, which would also be useful for its own and the NATO Alliance, it would welcome U.S. involvement in the issue. For Britain, the disengagement took place painlessly, inasmuch as it would not alter the Cypriot geo-political landscape.

Therefore, the British presence on the island under status as one of the guarantor powers that would just speculate on the evolution of the problem, would make no substantial difference on the outcome of the conflict. The United States substituted for the vacuum that might be caused by the British indifference. However, the Cyprus issue comprised more proof that the power of the omnipotent British Empire was on the decline. Accordingly, the British alignment with the U.S. foreign policy towards the dispute over Cyprus was a foreseeable outcome. Britain would actually remain closely aligned with the U.S. foreign policy, no matter the degree to which the latter might be effective concerning the resolution of the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus.

From the Greek point of view, the Cyprus issue would create more contention in the Greek-Turkish disputes. The initial U.S. response to the crisis was the Acheson Plan. Whereas in the beginning of the dispute over Cyprus, Greece was actively committed to *enosis* (union) with Cyprus, successive Greek governments soon realized that it would be

simply utopia to believe in such a conclusion. Therefore, Greece's position thereafter was that Cyprus should indeed be granted its independence. In its effort to achieve such a policy-goal, it consistently found the U.S. foreign policy if not directly opposed, then at least disinclined to Cypriot independence.

Furthermore, while the Cyprus issue evolved after 1967, the American involvement in it would inevitably require diplomatic interaction with the Greek junta of the Colonels. The Americans had demonstrated their indifference about the legitimacy of the Greek government for the sake of the service of their own strategic goals. The inevitable outcome would be alienation of the Greek people. Therefore, as soon as democracy was restored in Greece, the democratically established government would confront the U.S. with suspicion as to its honesty concerning the U.S.-Greek relations. These Greek sentiments would be further aggravated by the evolution of the situation in Cyprus that led to the Turkish invasion of 1974.

For the Greeks, it would be difficult to accept the inevitability of another American decisive involvement with the dispute over Cyprus. After all, the U.S. actually had supported the Colonels' junta, which had initiated the coup against the legitimate Cypriot government.

Moreover, there was another "fuzzy" issue concerning the U.S. involvement at the time: the role of the U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Mr. Kissinger was a significant person during the 1974 Cypriot crisis, because of the American domestic political situation. The country was entangled in the Watergate scandal, and President Nixon, the head of American foreign policy, was substantially weakened and on the verge of impeachment. Consequently, Secretary Kissinger had a substantial say in U.S.

foreign-policy matters. Mr. Kissinger alluded that he could not have known about the coup against Makarios in Cyprus.¹⁹⁴ However, during discussions he had with the Chinese Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kiao Guanhua, on 2 October 1974, he contradicted himself. Mr. Kissinger acknowledged that following Sampson's coup against Makarios and the following political instability in Greece, he expected that a Turkish invasion would take place. He further attributed the U.S. inactivity to resolve the conflict and avert the Turkish invasion of Cyprus to the bureaucratic practices of Washington.¹⁹⁵ Independent of whether the U.S. Administration knew about the Turkish plans in advance or not, however, the fuzziness of the American entanglement at this time inevitably caused anti-American sentiments in Greece. Therefore, no matter how friendly the post-junta Greek government might be to the United States, it would ultimately be heavily constrained by its constituency concerning the development of good bilateral relations. Moreover, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus of 1974 might be judged as the substantiation of the basic principle of the Acheson plan: *de facto* partition of Cyprus. The Acheson plan had created to the Greek minds bad memories about the U.S. involvement with the Cyprus issue. Therefore, the U.S. foreign policy was seemingly aligned with the Turkish aspirations for the conquest of Cyprus. This perceived alignment was an additional source for the development of anti-Americanism in Greece.

However, it should be noted that relations between the U.S. and Greece improved over the time. Greece after all, had been a traditional U.S. western ally throughout the twentieth century, since the Greek peoples had deeply rooted pro-western sentiments.

¹⁹⁴ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 205.

¹⁹⁵ Notis Papadopoulos, "Symphonia-Paketo Kissinger gia Aigaio-Kypro (Kissinger Book-Deal for the Aegean-Cyprus)," *To Vima*, 13 January 1999.

From the Turkish point of view, the dispute over Cyprus presented Turkey with a corking chance to legitimize its presence in the former Ottoman territories. During the first years of the Cyprus dispute in the 1960s, American foreign policy made adamantly clear that it would not “permit” Turkey to “set foot” on Cyprus. It was the U.S. foreign policy of the mid-1960s that alienated the Turks. Consequently, the Turkish-American bilateral relations reached a nadir. The U.S. foreign policy concerning the Cyprus problem combined with other issues that had already existed between the two countries (like the Turkish poppy cultivation issue), further increased tensions in U.S.-Turkish relations.

During the early 1970s however, the U.S.-Turkish relations began to improve drastically. The improvement was due mainly to the American foreign policy goal of promoting the U.S. geostrategic interests in the Middle East, and secondarily, to the dependence of Turkish economic development on the United States. The Middle East Peace Process was well underway and Turkey was an integral part of the Middle East. Therefore, the U.S. could not afford to alienate Turkey.

Bilateral relations between the two countries further improved after the U.S. exhibited substantial indifference to the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. However, it should be noted that the situation deteriorated after 1975, when the U.S. imposed the arms embargo against Turkey. The Turks felt somewhat betrayed by the U.S. and reacted almost immediately. Turkey closed all the U.S. bases that operated in the country, which was a deep blow to NATO’s infrastructure, since the Soviet Union was close to Turkish frontiers. The U.S., obviously alerted by such a development, hastened to restore the previous situation and continued providing military aid to Turkey after about one year.

Turkey however, despite the restoration of the previous situation, remained suspicious of U.S. intentions. Nonetheless, from the late 1970s on, the bilateral relations between the U.S. and Turkey remained good.

From Cyprus' point of view, the implications of the U.S. foreign policy were devastating. The U.S. initially had substantially contributed to the cohesion of the island Republic under the 1959–1960 accords. President Johnson's intervention in June 1964 and Cyrus Vance's shuttle diplomacy in 1967 were quite decisive to avert a Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

The U.S. influence over Greece and Turkey could be a critical factor in resolving and possibly permanently settling the Cyprus problem. However, such an influence has not yet been exerted by the U.S. on the participants in the Cyprus dispute. Especially after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the Cypriots felt that the Americans were isolated and strictly interested in accommodating only their own strategic interests, no matter what the costs of such arrangement, even if they concluded an unfair settlement of the Cyprus issue.

The Cyprus crisis of 1964 was the outcome of the complicated agreement that had granted the island its independence. Therefore, it would be natural for Cyprus to look elsewhere for help in order to acquire their legitimate right for independence. The most convenient direction to look for help in this case was the Soviet Union: Cyprus was a non-aligned country, and accordingly, it would be susceptible to Soviet influence. Furthermore, the Soviets, from the beginning of the dispute, accommodated the Cypriot claims.

The UN was the natural institution to involve itself in the Cyprus dispute. From the beginning however, the UN administration did not understand the realities of the dispute. Accordingly, the first UN resolution concerning the creation of the UNFICYP proved that the UN believed that the Cyprus issue was a dispute that would easily be resolved in a three-month period. However, the events that followed the establishment of the UN force on Cyprus proved that resolution would not be so easy for the UN to achieve. Consequently, the United Nations peacekeeping capacity came into question. The UN response and mediation proved ineffective both in deterring mounting violence on Cyprus and in resolving the situation. The Cyprus issue was just one more unresolved UN commitment, added to the long list of UN shortcomings, which would eventually lead up to the recently generated debates over the effectiveness of the organization itself.

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